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INTRODUCTION
Patent owners have managed to offend almost everyone. Patented
1
pharmaceuticals come at breathtakingly high prices, while their owners
2
pay others not to produce cheaper generics. Dense patent thickets
hamper competitive entry and waste existing participants’ energies and
3
resources on defensive portfolios and intramural litigation. Patents on
4
5
the stuff of life constrain agricultural activity and medical innovation,
6
making it harder to eat well and obtain treatment for what ails us.
Patent owners attach conditions to goods we buy, limiting our ability to
7
use and sell them to others. Non-producing patent-holding companies

1. The United States Government Accountability Office report provides a good
description of the concerns. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-201, BRANDNAME PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING: LACK OF THERAPEUTICALLY EQUIVALENT DRUGS
AND LIMITED COMPETITION MAY CONTRIBUTE TO EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10201.pdf (last visited August 2, 2010).
2. The issue has garnered judicial, administrative and legislative attention. See, e.g.,
Ark. Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund, Paper, A.F. of L. v. Bayer AG (In re
Ciprofloxacin), 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc denied, 2010 WL 3464382 (C.A.
2); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009); Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006); Tony Dutra, “Senate Judiciary Committee Likely to
Modify Bill Banning Reverse Payment Agreements,” Pat. Trademark & Copyright Law
Daily (BNA) (Sept. 11, 2009), reprinted in 9/11/2009 PTD d10 (Westlaw); “House
Subcommittee Approves Bill to Ban Reverse Payments to Generic Drug Firms,” Pat.
Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA) (June 4, 2009), reprinted in 6/4/2009 PTD d4
(Westlaw); Jacqueline Bell, FTC Pushes Congress to Pass Drug Settlement Bill, LAW 360
(June 3, 2009), http://www.law360.com/print_article/104204.
3. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the thicket
concern); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 303–08, 321 (2006–07); Carl
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1
INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECON. 119 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 871 (2008); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 1342 (2007).
5. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378; Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of
Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 439–49 (2003–04) (discussing the
effects of Reach-Through Royalties).
6. Id. See also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (an on-going lawsuit in the Southern District of New York involving patents
on breast and ovarian cancer genetic diagnostics which gate access to related testing); Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (writ of certiorari
dismissed as improvidently granted); Prometheus Lab., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Serv., 581
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, remanded, 130 S.Ct. 3543 (2010).
7. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(addressing the validity of such restrictions); Daniel L. Reisner, Patent Licensing and Misuse
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8

ambush industry standards that improve quality and ease of use and
9
demand tolls from anyone doing anything successfully.
10
There ought to be a law. There is. It is called patent misuse. When
a patent owner overreaches, the courts refuse to enforce the patent until
the related harm has been undone. That sounds eminently reasonable.
When patent owners interfere with society, society takes their patents
Issues, in DEVELOPMENTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW 2008 (PLI
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 17180, 2008),
944 PLI/Pat 87 (Westlaw) and Patricia A. Martone & Richard M. Feustel, Jr., The Patent
Misuse Defense–Does it Still Have Vitality?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 2005
(PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 6250,
2005), 832 PLI/Pat 145 (Westlaw) (both discussing the myriad forms of licensing restrictions,
their practical effects and legal validity); Katherine E. White, A Rule for Determining When
Patent Misuse Should Be Applied, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671
(2001) (analyzing the effects of such restraints). The extensive use of conditional
conveyances has given rise to renewed interest in the doctrine of patent exhaustion. See, e.g.,
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale
Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective (Univ. of Iowa Legal
Stud. Res., Paper No. 10-08, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1540527; Thomas
G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the Supreme Court’s Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc.
v. LG Elec., Inc., 49 IDEA 517 (2008–09). As patent exhaustion constrains imposing post-sale
restrictions on patented products, it overlaps with misuse. See infra note 54 (discussing the
overlap in the Court’s analysis in its seminal misuse case).
8. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1318 (2009), and Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (both
dismissing standards ambush allegations). See also Vincent Chiappetta, Patenting Industry
Standards, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY ch. 26 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2008) [hereinafter
Chiappetta, Standards]; Apostolos Chronopoulos, Patenting Standards—A Case for US
Antitrust Law or a Call for Recognizing Immanent Public Policy Limitations to the
Exploitation Rights Conferred by the Patent Act?, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. AND
COMPETITION LAW 782 (2009); Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of
Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623 (2002).
9. The literature is legion, but the Supreme Court decision in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), provides useful judicial insight into the concern,
particularly Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Current congressional efforts regarding patent
reform also focus on the issue. See Tony Dutra, “Patent Trolls Focus of House Judiciary
Committee Hearing on Patent Reform Bill,” Pat., Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA)
(May 1, 2009), reprinted in 5/1/2009 PTD d1 (Westlaw).
10. The history and details of the regime are discussed in detail infra at Part I.B. The
misuse doctrine has also been applied in other intellectual property regimes, in particular
copyright law. Although the economic efficiency arguments made with regard to patent
misuse apply equally to other regimes, distinct policy considerations and the resulting
adjustments to the right to exclude (for example the fair use and idea-expression dichotomy
free speech considerations in copyright law) make direct application inappropriate. Those
differences make the intriguing effort to produce a unified approach to misuse extremely
problematic. See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure (Univ. of Iowa Legal Stud.
Res., Paper No. 09-41, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474407; Thomas F. Cotter,
Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901 (2007–08); Gary Myers, Toward a Unified Theory of
Intellectual Property Misuse (Univ. of Miss. Sch. of Law, Working Paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507173. The arguments and conclusions in this discussion are
explicitly limited to patent misuse.
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away.
But not everyone feeling patent pain can legitimately claim misuse.
Patent law expressly intends and depends upon patent owners
11
interfering with others’ desires. Misuse only occurs when the pain
exceeds the inherent costs of the system—the harm society has decided
individuals must bear to obtain the regime’s benefits.
Distinguishing between inherent and excessive/misuse costs has
12
proven problematic. We do not even agree that the misuse doctrine
should exist, much less when it should apply. Some argue misuse stands
as a vital guardian of patent policy, particularly the regime’s mission of
13
promoting innovation.
Others argue that, at best, the doctrine
uselessly duplicates the role of other laws (notably antitrust); while at
14
worst it affirmatively interferes with efficient market operation.
Unsurprisingly, confusion also reigns at the coalface of application.
15
The Supreme Court created the doctrine almost a century ago when
society was feeling the powerful effects of unchecked monopoly, patent
and otherwise, and determining how best to respond. Despite the
considerable refinement of the patent and antitrust regimes, the Court
11. The patent system is discussed infra at Part I.A.
12. For examples of the myriad changes in the doctrine see, e.g., Richard Calkins,
Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 178–92
(1988–89); Daniel P. Homiller, Patent Misuse in Patent Pool Licensing: From National
Harrow to “The Nine No-Nos” to Not Likely, 7 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 3–18 (2006);
Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal
Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 669 (2001–02).
13. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 5, at 401; Joe Potenza et al., Patent Misuse—The
Crucial Balance, A Patent Lawyer’s View, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 69, 71 (2005–06).
14. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1982); Mark
A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 1599, 1600 (1990) (arguing misuse and antitrust should be coextensive); David
McGowan, What Tool Works Tells Us about Tailoring Patent Misuse Remedies, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 421, 428 (2008) (also focusing on the doctrine’s remedial disconnection from related
harm). Professor Lemley appears to have recanted the more general position (without
specific explanation of where the error lies), but stands by the argument that the misuse
remedy is improperly calibrated to resulting harms. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: the Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 152
n. 188 (1999). See also Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent Misuse
Doctrine (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 10-30, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616275 (offering a useful review of four possible misuse
justifications, which he ultimately rejects while stopping short of calling for unqualified
abolition of the doctrine).
15. The first inklings of misuse are found in the Supreme Court’s 1917 decision in
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Challenges to
patent use, of course, arose earlier, but where initially resolved in favor of the patent owner.
See Calkins, supra note 12, at 178 and infra Part I.B (discussing the origins and development
of the misuse doctrine).
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has not revisited the substantive law of patent misuse for almost forty
16
years. Congress, the legislative custodian of the patent system, has
only kibitzed, indicating that market power is important, but (perhaps)
17
only sometimes. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the
“Federal Circuit”) finds itself in the inopportune middle, seeking to
reconcile the Supreme Court’s past with its present. The resulting
misuse chimera first attempts to apply the vague misuse “exceeding the
scope of the patent” test to identify problematic provisions, then makes
the determination by awkwardly relying on modern antitrust
anticompetitive effects assessment except when Court precedent
18
explicitly requires otherwise.
The time has come to dispense with patent misuse entirely. In the
prevailing market efficiency paradigm, the doctrine’s limitations on
exploitation of patent rights are not only superfluous, but affirmatively
harmful. Misuse’s purely defensive posture, incoherent and inaccurate
“scope of the patent” inquiry, and poorly-calibrated, one-size-fits-all
blanket unenforceability remedy have been rendered obsolete by
subsequent, more nuanced legal responses to potential patent power.
Antitrust law draws more appropriate balances between maximizing
patent incentives while minimizing undue interference with market
operation and innovation. Inequitable conduct, abuse of process,
antitrust sham litigation, and Walker Process liability more effectively
control abuses of the patent prosecution process and improper
assertions of patent rights. Granted, these regimes remain imperfectly
implemented, but their approach and experience provide a far more
16. The last substantive misuse case was Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (providing flexibility in the doctrine’s application, as discussed infra
notes 166–72 and accompanying text). The Court did reference misuse in Blonder-Tongue
Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), but not for substantive application. Rather,
the Court discussed the doctrine’s public policy-based “invention” limitation on the reach of
the patent “monopoly” as a justification for applying res judicata/collateral estoppel when a
patent has been invalidated. Since Blonder-Tongue, the Court has twice discussed misuse,
but in both cases only to note the evolution away from the doctrine’s assumption that a
patent creates market power and related market harms and toward an antitrust net effects
assessment. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Dawson Chem.
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221–23 (1980).
17. See infra notes 91–103 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional actions
regarding misuse).
18. The Federal Circuit’s most recent attempt was the en banc decision in Princo Corp.
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The case reaffirmed the applicability
of the “scope of the patent” and “anticompetitive effects” tests (the six judge majority, joined
on the issue by the two concurring justices and the two dissenters) but featured a
disagreement over how they related to one another and should be applied. See infra notes
84–89 and accompanying text (discussing in more detail the Federal Circuit’s attempt to
reconcile per se misuse precedent with antitrust anticompetitive effects inquiry).
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effective foundation for making the necessary adjustments. Continued
availability of the misuse defense wastes time and resources on a
pointless struggle to update an antiquated doctrine that unnecessarily
decreases access and, contrary to its defender’s claims, interferes with
rather than advances patent policy.
The Federal Circuit’s current “mixed” approach does much to
mitigate the problem. But as a circuit court, it remains constrained by
19
Supreme Court precedent. That latter Court should take the earliest
20
opportunity to eliminate its now outdated doctrine. Failing prompt
judicial action, Congress should use the current reform effort as a
vehicle for legislative abolition.
Beyond clarifying that misuse has outlived its purpose, the inquiry
into the doctrine’s justifications provides useful insights regarding how
to ease the difficult problem of living with patents. An appropriate
relationship must be predicated on two facts: first, patents unavoidably
cause pain and unhappiness and second, people feeling the adverse
effects inevitably will complain. The misuse inquiry reveals that
legitimate complaints only arise from two sources: (1) improper
implementation producing harms unnecessary to achieve an agreed
upon goal, or (2) unhappiness with the goal (currently, that frequently
means with the consequences of the prevailing market efficiency
paradigm).
The misuse inquiry also clarifies the appropriate response.
Punishing those who obtain and use patents in accordance with existing
laws resolves neither problem. Our many implementation debates
require application of legal expertise to adjust patent law’s issuance
requirements, rights and remedies, and antitrust and other general law
requirements governing market exploitation. But we must avoid
conflating those primarily technical problems resolved by applying
metrics reflecting the stated goal with complaints arising from the
efficiency paradigm’s intrinsic inability to produce certain social
outcomes. For example, many seeking limitations on pharmaceutical
patent holder reverse payments are unhappy with the existing patent
system’s distributional consequences. Similarly, those labeling patent
owner interferences with industry standards “ambushes” and royalty
seeking, non-practicing patent owners “trolls” are expressing “moral”
disapproval of the intensely self-interested competitive behavior which,

19. See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuits
efforts to cabin the doctrine while remaining consistent with Supreme Court precedent).
20. See infra notes 260–74 and accompanying text (discussing the justification for
Supreme Court reversal of these long-standing precedents).
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as Adam Smith explained, serves as the essential driver of an efficient
21
market economy.
Coherent debate in these latter situations requires explicit
identification and discussion of our underlying normative differences.
Until we have determined what the patent/legal system should produce,
there is little value in proposing and assessing specific implementation
strategies. That unproductively jumbles what is to be achieved with how
an unresolved “it” can best be produced, guaranteeing the confusion
and discord of talking past rather than to each other. It is better to
recognize our disagreements on the “right” and seek a mutually
acceptable compromise. In that difficult process, we should not only
recognize that one person’s “justice” is another’s “misuse,” but that our
differing beliefs have, and importantly, are frequently predicated on,
their practical consequences.
In particular, distributional and
behavioral outcomes can profoundly affect our social relationships,
including others’ ultimate continued participation. When considered
from the perspective of preserving the fabric of society, making
concessions on patent policy may prove a much simpler proposition.
Part I below provides the general context for the misuse inquiry. It
first describes the prevailing efficiency-driven legal paradigm and its
implementation in patent and generally applicable law (including
antitrust). It then discusses the history of and rationale for the misuse
doctrine. Part II explains why misuse cannot be justified within the
existing legal paradigm and how its continued existence causes
affirmative social harm. Part III discusses appropriate next steps: the
prompt legislative or judicial elimination of patent misuse and how we
can use the misuse experience to more productively discuss our
difficulties in living with patents.
PART I: THE CONTEXT
A. Patent Policy–The Economic Efficiency Paradigm, in Brief
A doctrine designed to prevent the misuse of a patent system must
start from understanding its proper operation. Patents give their owners
22
the legal right to prevent others from using the covered invention.
21. See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (Everyman’s Library, 1991) (1776) (“It is
not from the benevolence of the butcher, brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to
their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”).
22. Under current United States patent law, that generally means the right to prevent
others from making, using, offering to sell, selling or importing the patented invention. See 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
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That exclusionary right restricts access and produces related individual
23
and social costs. The decision to grant patents indicates that society
has determined some goal justifies absorbing those costs. By definition,
a patent owner can only misuse a patent right if the use generates costs
exceeding those required to produce the desired outcome.
24
There are many possible justifications for creating patent rights.
The primary justification for current United States patent law can,
25
however, be readily identified. The regime forms an integral part of a
larger commercial law system designed to foster efficient operation of
26
our primarily market-based economy. Because patent law does not
exist in isolation, understanding its role and what constitute its inherent
costs requires a brief look at the overall system.
The efficient market model serves as the primary organizing
27
principle for economic relationships in the United States. The invisible
hand of self-interested competition, acting through individually
23. The harms can be individual (inability to obtain desired or necessary resources)
and/or societal (for example, harm to efficient market operation in the aggregate) as
discussed infra in Part II.A.
24. The diverse list of justifications can usefully be focused on three core concepts:
Lockean labor theory, personal autonomy/personhood interests, and economic market
efficiency/utility theory. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGY AGE 2–19 (Aspen Revised 4th ed. 2007) (one of many casebooks
ably introducing law students to the range of justifications for granting individual intellectual
property rights to exclude). The initial decision to create a patent regime must, of course,
also address normative positions which reject granting individual rights, in particular
communitarian visions of society. See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing
to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 333, 375–81 [hereinafter Chiappetta, International].
25. Identification of the justification does not make it “right” in the normative sense.
It merely means that, for better or worse, it is in fact what currently drives United States
patent law.
26. Of course, the entire United States legal system does not implement market
efficiency goals. Many laws impose requirements on our social interactions independently of
efficiency considerations. But the significant core of commercial law regulating our economic
relationships, of which patent law forms an integral part, does, for the reasons discussed
below in the text. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 2 (5th
ed. 1998) (summarizing the use and limitations of economic theory as an analytical tool for
explaining and assessing law) and generally (providing numerous examples of its application);
infra notes 27–34 identifying various examples. See also Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks:
More Than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL. 35, 39–40 (discussing the triumph
of market efficiency/utility theory over other justifications for United States intellectual
property rights).
27. The development of modern antitrust law provides a clear example of the primacy
of market efficiency in the US commercial law system. See PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL.,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 38–39 (6th ed. 2004) (“the vast majority of congressmen were sincere
proponents of a private enterprise system,” that is the market economy); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, ch. 1–2 (3d ed. 2005); POSNER, supra note 26,
ch. 10. See also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
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negotiated and agreed exchanges, drives the vast bulk of production and
consumption decisions, as well as ultimate resource allocations. The
related bias against directive governmental intervention has produced a
complex, integrated commercial law system primarily focused on
28
process.
In lieu of dictating outcomes, these laws reduce the
disconnection between the theoretical assumptions essential to efficient
market operation (in the economic theory meaning of “efficiency”) and
29
the real world in which actual market exchanges take place.
For
example, fraud and the securities laws mandate disclosures to reduce
30
asymmetrical information. Environmental and nuisance laws constrain
31
Contract and business organization statutes
negative externalities.
32
provide templates reducing transaction costs.
The overall system objective of maximizing market efficiency has
two important consequences regarding legal interventions. First, it
means that every legal intervention must be assessed with the overall
framework. Although specific laws will target improvements in a
particular theoretical assumption, it must do so by producing a “net”
efficiency improvement, taking into account the adverse effects of its
requirements. For example, a proposed residential seller disclosure law
might mandate disclosure of latent defects to reduce information
33
asymmetries.
Those efficiency enhancing improvements are not,
however, sufficient to justify the legal intervention standing alone. If
the related compliance costs exceed the benefits of the additional
information (particularly in light of alternatives such as buyer
inspections) then the requirement must either be adjusted to produce a
net benefit or be abandoned.
Antitrust law provides the most explicit doctrinal articulation of the
net improvement requirement. The regime exists primarily to maximize
the “perfect competition” assumption vital to an efficiently operating
34
market.
Although interference with competition triggers antitrust
28. Antitrust law also provides a good example of the process versus outcome
orientation of most U.S. commercial laws. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 10.
29. See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS ch.
6 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing basic microeconomic theory and the market “failure” problems of
monopoly, information, externalities and public goods). See generally POSNER, supra note 26
(discussing these problems in connection with various legal regimes).
30. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 329–34; POSNER, supra note 26, at 122–
26, 486–90.
31. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 351–61; POSNER, supra note 26, at 68–
72, 410–16.
32. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 26, at 108.
33. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 334; POSNER, supra note 26, at 68–72,
410–16.
34. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 5–10, 37–40; HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, at ch. 1
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concern, it does not, standing alone, constitute a violation under the
35
regime’s primary assessment mechanism—the Rule of Reason. That
rule permits even clear restraints when “reasonable,” that is, found
essential to producing other greater efficiency improvements resulting
36
in an overall net gain. For example, a price-fixing agreement among
competitors significantly impairs competition.
Nonetheless, such
agreements will pass Rule of Reason muster when it plays an essential
role in producing the offsetting benefit of a collaborative new product
37
offering.
Second, an efficient market system focuses exclusively on net
38
aggregate outcomes. The distributional effects of a legal intervention
producing a net overall improvement are irrelevant. Concerns over who
specifically receives what benefits or suffers what burdens involve
distinct and frequently conflicting normative considerations requiring
separate discussion and resolution.
Patent law’s specific role in the efficiency system focuses on
39
innovation. Innovation performs a vital market function—producing
(indicating that other values may play a role, but the central objective is to “police the
highways of commerce” to ensure “full and free competition”).
35. Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration
Among Competitors (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines]
(providing a helpful overview of the Rule of Reason approach). Those agencies provide
useful insight into Rule of Reason analysis as applied to intellectual property exploitation.
See Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (Apr. 6, 1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm (last visited March 12, 2010)
[hereinafter Licensing Guidelines].
36. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (articulating the
fundamental rule of reason proposition that as every agreement restrains trade to some
extent, the antitrust inquiry is whether it promotes or suppresses competition based on its
overall effects); Broad. Music v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (showing that
the rule of reason inquiry requires determining whether the agreement is “one designed to
‘increase economic efficiency and render markets more rather than less competitive’”);
LAWERENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 229–43 (2d ed. 2006).
37. See, e.g., Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 19–24 (creation of the new product—a portfolio
use license—requires pricing agreement for the product among the individual copyright
owners); Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 35.
38. The market efficiency approach to economic organization reflects what John Rawls
labels a “pure justice” system (one which defines generally applicable rules of the game
rather than dictates outcomes) in contrast with a “perfect justice” system (one which
produces specific outcomes). See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74–75 (HARVARD
UNIV. PRESS 1999) (1971). This system structure generates some of our more profound
disagreements (patent and otherwise), particularly visible in the vigorous debates over
appropriate economic distributional outcomes and behavioral norms. See infra Part III.B.2.
39. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 127; Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper
Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don’t Know Where We Want to Go, We’re Unlikely to Get
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the new products and processes that increase output and reduce price.
Efficiency theory posits that optimal levels of innovation depend on
prospective inventors’ abilities to internalize returns on their
40
investments.
Third party use of an inventor’s innovations (“freeriding”) interferes with capturing those returns resulting in underinvestment in, and related under-production of, innovation.
The Framers found this free-riding “market failure” of sufficient
41
concern to address it in the Constitution.
Among Congress’
enumerated powers in Article I, section 8 is the right to “secure” to
inventors the exclusive rights to their inventions for limited times in
42
order “to Promote the Progress of [the] useful Arts.” Congress used
43
this power to pass the first federal patent statute in 1790.
The patent law solution is a classic efficiency-driven legal
intervention. Rather than dictating specific innovation investments or
44
outcomes, it leaves those decisions to market dynamics. Individuals
target innovations they believe merit investment based on projected
market success. The patent exclusionary right prohibits free-riding and
45
permits the inventor/investor to capture associated returns. However,
obtaining actual returns depends on the transactional demand for the
resulting invention. Success can generate monopoly profits. Market
failure extinguishes the pursuit, redirecting energy and resources to
other activities.
There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 289, 306–07 (2000–01) [hereinafter Chiappetta,
Internet] (elaborating on the argument which follows in the text).
40. See supra note 21 (discussing Adam Smith’s vision of what motivates individual
action). If this is not true, then we might reconsider whether we want a patent law at all.
41. See Graham v. John Deer Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–11 (describing the discussion between
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison regarding the former’s monopoly concerns, with
Madison’s limited incentive position eventually prevailing).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 6–7; MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 121–24 (describing
the evolution to present day). The Patent Act is currently codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376
(2006).
44. Patent law requires the inventive effort involve the “useful Arts,” a term whose
breadth remains unclear. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Beyond that, the
current regime imposes virtually no constraints regarding the field of invention, leaving the
decisions of where to invest, when to invest, and how much to invest to individual decision.
See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unless
Congress specifically limits the field of invention, which it has declined to do in all but one
limited situation involving nuclear weapons; the courts do not make further “utility”
determinations concerning the desirability of particular innovations).
45. As the Court and commentators point out, although the returns flow to the patentowner, patent law does not exist to reward the inventor. The patent “reward” serves merely
as the means for achieving the system goal of preventing free-riding distortion of aggregate
investment decisions. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 511 (1917); supra note 41.
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As with other laws implementing the system’s efficiency objective,
46
patent law does not “progress the useful arts” at all costs. The regime
must do more than maximize overall investment in innovation. It must
produce a net improvement in efficient market operation, taking into
account the decreased access resulting from the exclusionary right, such
as interference with competitive use, deadweight loss, and impaired
47
follow-on innovation.
The net improvement requirement can be readily identified in the
regime’s requirements governing issuance and rights. The novelty, nonobviousness and operational (utility) requirements ensure that actual
innovation benefits exist before society incurs any patent exclusionary
48
49
costs. The Constitutional “limited times” constraint mitigates costs by
capping access restrictions and supra-competitive returns to the patent
term set by Congress. Inventor enablement and publication obligations
provide public notice and knowledge, reducing duplicative investment
and inadvertent use as well as facilitating improvements and post-term
implementation by others.
Whether these requirements in fact generate a net improvement in
50
efficiency remains the subject of vigorous debate.
There is no
question, however, that this goal (at least for now) remains the regime’s
primary objective, meaning that patent law’s exclusionary rights should
only be granted when they generate optimal increases in innovation in
light of the related harms to efficient market operation.
Understanding the overarching efficiency goal provides three
important guidelines for the misuse inquiry. First, when internal patent
46. The compromise between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison balanced the
former’s monopoly harms concerns against incentives for innovation as epitomized in
Jefferson’s summing up that allowing patents requires “drawing a line between the things
which are worth to the public the embarrassment of a patent, and those which are not” (see
Graham, 383 U.S. at 10–11 (describing the debate and quoting Jefferson)).
47. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 1.3 (discussing the adverse economic
effects of monopoly).
48. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an
“Article of Manufacture: Software as Such as the Right Stuff,” 17 J. MARSHALL. J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 89, 99–106 (1998) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Software].
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra note 41.
50. That discussion ranges across the full range of patent law cost concerns, including
whether the covered subject matter is overly inclusive, see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010) (reinforcing the proposition that not all innovation is patentable but leaving open the
question of how that determination should be made), the legal sufficiency of the “invention”
requirements (evolving standard of obviousness after KSR Int’l. Co. v. Telefex, Inc., 550 U.S.
398 (2007)), the capacity of the United States Patent Office to perform adequate evaluations,
the efficacy of post-issuance challenge processes and the scope of the exclusionary right,
including the appropriate remedies. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing how these issues might
be approached).
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rules governing issuance, rights, and remedies produce net inefficiencies
on their own terms, those harms do not constitute patent misuse. If
patent law inevitably produces unwarranted harms, punishing owners of
validly acquired patents for exercising the related rights entirely misses
the point and certainly cannot solve the problem. Improper doctrinal
implementation (for example, inadequately stringent standards for
novelty/obviousness or an excessive term for the exclusionary right)
requires a direct doctrinal response–recalibration of the faulty
51
requirements.
Second, merely because a patent causes individual unhappiness does
not make it “misuse.” A legitimate complaint only arises when harm
inessential to accomplishing the system goal occurs. Current patent law
may well focus too intently on producing maximal efficiency market
outcomes and insufficiently on distributional consequences. But as with
improper calibration, using misuse as the corrective device illogically
sanctions patent owners for doing what the present regime not only
permits but is affirmatively designed to encourage. The desire to
temper or redirect patent law’s objectives should be raised
transparently, not through a cloud of vague misuse complaints.
Finally, treating patent and antitrust law as components of an overall
system substantially clarifies the complicated relationship between
52
them. Although antitrust law seeks to maximize competition, while
patent law affirmatively impairs it, neither pursues its role singlemindedly and autonomously. Rather they (together with other regimes)
operate cooperatively in pursuit of the same larger goal—better aligning
51. The distinction drawn in the text explains why the “exceeds the scope of the
patent” misuse inquiry proves so unworkable in practice. The only inherent costs within the
“scope of the patent” are those resulting from the exercise of the right to exclude – the refusal
to grant access to the invention. Although that refusal can impose excess costs, they arise
from faulty implementation calling for statutory adjustment, not “misuse” by the patent
owner. In contrast any grant of access goes beyond the patent right to exclude and raises the
possibility of excessive “misuse” costs arising from the terms of grant. Ironically, the Court
clearly recognized the distinction between inherent “patent rights” costs and additional
“private access rights” costs, but then unhelpfully framed the inquiry as based on conditions
which exceed the scope of the patent. That test implies some access conditions constitute an
inherent cost of a patent grant and are, therefore, exempt from review. Compare infra notes
110–121 (the Court’s identification of misuse as arising from privately created rights) with
notes 54–72 (creation of the “scope of the patent” assessment).
52. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 761 (2002); Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 3 (2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition
Policy, 2 MEADOR LECTURES (U. OF ALA.) 49 (2007–08); Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance
Between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 237 (2007); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges
of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTI.
L. J. 913, 917 (2001).
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an imperfect real world with the assumptions required for maximally
efficient overall market operation. When they interact, the issue is not
determining which regime should prevail. It is ensuring their joint
application produces a maximally efficient market.
Together these understandings cabin the appropriate justifications
for misuse. Internal implementation errors and unhappiness with patent
law’s existing goals raise problems antecedent to misuse. They are
better addressed directly, not by punishing those doing what the law
allows. Valid misuse concerns only arise when a patent owner’s
activities impose costs beyond those necessary to accomplish the
regime’s established objective. But even in such cases, merely causing
harm does not justify legal prohibition. The “system” question must
also be answered—are the “excess” costs essential to producing a net
overall efficiency gain? If so, then no misuse has occurred.
B. The Origins and Evolution of the Patent Misuse Doctrine
A perfectly calibrated patent system producing an optimum net
improvement in innovation does not eliminate costs. It affirmatively
imposes them. The regime explicitly intends patent owners will use
their exclusionary right to maximize individual returns, thus realizing on
the incentives driving them to invest and produce the increase in
innovation. The result is unavoidable interference with others’ use.
The more successful the patent, the greater the resulting pain, as
owners will increase price and constrain output to ensure the greatest
personal surplus possible. Consumers who can afford access will
transfer significant wealth to the patent owner, while the others will be
left to pursue such second-best alternatives as may exist. These
limitations will constrain follow-on research and related development of
new products and applications. That in turn will increase the price and
reduce availability of those resulting products and services, adversely
affecting those desiring to acquire or improve them.
Self-interested patent exploitation also produces a wide variety of
53
non-price interferences. For example, licensees may only be granted
the right to make a particular product or sell in a specific geographic or
consumer market. Or, they may be required to purchase other goods
and services from the patent owner, not to deal with third party
competitors, or to grant-back rights to improvements they develop.
End-users may be similarly constrained by, for example, a single use,
no-refill restriction on products incorporating the invention. At the
extreme, patent owners may suppress the invention entirely—
53. See supra note 7.
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prohibiting all use and requiring that society forego the benefits of the
invention during the entire patent term.
These restrictions made licensees and end-consumers unhappy and
others (particularly competitors) suspicious that patent holders were
unfairly maximizing individual return at theirs and the public’s expense.
In response to such complaints, aired by way of legal action, the
Supreme Court created patent misuse.
The doctrine’s origins trace back to the Court’s 1917 decision in
54
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. The
case involved two patents owned by a patent holding company. The
first patent covered a uniquely functional film feeder for movie
projectors. The second patent involved certain less-desirable filmmaking techniques. Under an agreement the Court somewhat quaintly
referred to as “a paper styled ‘License Agreement,’” the holding
company limited use of all projectors incorporating its patented film
feeder to showing movies made by authorized licensees of its film
making techniques. The defendant used a projector incorporating the
patented feeder to show a film not meeting the License Agreement
limitation. The holding company sued the projector owner for
infringing the film feeder patent based on non-licensed use.
The Court found against the plaintiff patent owner. Doing so
required it to reverse nearly twenty years of prior decisions upholding
similar patent owner licensing requirements mandating licensee use of
55
“supplies . . . which are no part of the [patented machine].”
The
Court’s analysis focused on such limitations’ inconsistency with patent
policy. Finding that patent law’s primary purpose was to benefit the
public by encouraging innovation and not “the creation of private
54. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Professor Hovenkamp makes the good point that the Court’s
reasoning in Motion Picture invokes the related doctrine of patent exhaustion. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 7; Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 515–16. And certainly the Court only
later expressly identifies and creates the distinct misuse defense and unenforceability sanction
in Morton Salt. See infra notes 67–75. However, as both doctrines seek to prevent
inappropriate patent use, they bear a close relationship to each other. Consequently, the
inquiry into misuse justifications benefits substantially from examining the foundational
reasoning for restricting patent licenses in Motion Picture. In its recent Princo decision, the
Federal Circuit majority indicates that misuse may complement exhaustion—the latter
applying to unconditional sales of patented goods, the former governing terms imposed in
“conditional sales or licenses.” Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2010). That statement will likely trigger another round of debate over the proper
reach of the exhaustion doctrine, in particular whether it prohibits post-sale conditions in all
circumstances. See supra note 7. That in turn will require sorting out any related effects on
misuse. Better to eliminate misuse and avoid the confusion, leaving exhaustion to stand or
fall independently.
55. See Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 514–18 (discussing the prior law permitting such
requirements). See also Calkins, supra note 12, at 179–80.
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fortunes for the owners of patents,” the Court reasoned that although
57
“inventors should be fairly, even liberally, treated” protecting the
public against unjustified costs required that an inventor’s rights “must
58
be limited to the invention described in the claims of his patent.”
Delivering on that policy limitation made it “not competent for the
owner of [a] patent . . . to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent
monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its
59
operation . . . .” Specifically, as “[t]he patent law furnishes no warrant
for such a practice . . . the cost, inconvenience and annoyance to the
60
public . . . forbid it.”
Applied to the facts, the Court found the film feeder patent claims
did not extend to the mandated film making techniques, thus putting
them outside the plaintiff’s legal right to exclude. As a result, enforcing
the License Agreement limitation on the use of the film feeder would be
“wholly without the scope and purpose of our patent laws” and “gravely
61
injurious to . . . public interest.”
The Court concluded that the
62
restriction must, therefore, be declared “plainly void.” Finally, the
Court affirmed the lower court’s holding that without the limitation, no
infringement occurred, apparently agreeing that the challenged use of
the projector fell within the “implied right to use the machine as it had
63
been used.”
The Court concluded by noting that the newly minted Clayton Act
antitrust statute prohibition on “tying” (in this case requiring use of the
film-making technique to obtain the highly desirable film feeder) was “a
most persuasive [supporting] expression of the public policy of our
64
country with respect to the question before us.” However, having
already reached the unenforceability conclusion on independent patent
policy grounds, the Court declined to determine whether the License
65
Agreement restriction also violated antitrust laws.
After Motion Picture, the Court continued to apply the patent

56. See Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 511. This finding reflects the prevailing economic
efficiency justification for patent law, focusing on the benefit to society as a whole, rather
than on rewarding the efforts of the individual inventor. See supra notes 38–50 and
accompanying text.
57. See Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 511.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 516.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 519.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 508.
64. Id. at 517–18.
65. Id. at 517.
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policy-based rationale to render limitations imposed by patent owners
66
unenforceable. However, it was not until its Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
67
Suppiger Co. decision twenty-five years later that the Court expressly
labeled the defense “misuse” and created the present blanket
unenforceability-of-the-patent remedy. The Morton Salt Company held
patents on machines used to deposit salt tablets during the canning
process. All licenses covering the patented machines limited their use to
salt tablets purchased from a Morton Salt subsidiary. When a third
party began selling the patented machines, Morton Salt sued for
infringement. The defendant argued that the machine patents should be
held unenforceable because the related licenses tied use of the machines
to purchase of salt in violation of the Clayton Act. The court of appeals
found for Morton Salt, holding that the Clayton Act requirement that
the challenged act must “substantially lessen competition” had not been
68
satisfied.
The Supreme Court reversed; however, instead of addressing the
lower court’s antitrust holding, the Court invoked patent misuse. The
reasoning started from the proposition that the patent holder was using
“its patent monopoly to restrain competition in the marketing of
69
unpatented articles” (in this case the salt). The Court then applied the
Motion Picture patent policy rationale, finding the “public policy
adopted by the Constitution and the laws of the United States ‘to
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts . . .’” precludes uses
of a patent which extends the owner’s rights beyond the scope of the
70
covered invention. As Morton Salt’s tie produced “an exclusive right
or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office” (that is, on the
salt which was not included within the machine claims), the related
71
license limitation was “contrary to the public interest.” The Court
concluded that Morton Salt’s abuse of its patent rights triggered the
doctrine of unclean hands, and the related equitable considerations
dictated that the courts should refuse to enforce not just the specific
72
restriction, but the patent.
Withholding patent enforcement on equity and public policy
grounds had two important remedial consequences. First, the Court
found that the adverse effect on the public interest “disqualifies the
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Calkins, supra note 12, at 181.
314 U.S. 488 (1942).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
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[patentee] to maintain . . . suit regardless of whether the particular
73
defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent.” That made
misuse a complete defense to infringement by any party, even those
unaffected by the specific action constituting misuse. It therefore
applied not just to potential contributory infringers (those selling salt for
use with the machines in violation of the license) but even direct
infringers, such as the defendants, who made and sold the patented
invention. Second, in order to repair the damage to the public interest,
the Court found the bar to enforcement must continue “at least until it
is made to appear that the improper practice as been abandoned and the
74
consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated.”
Beyond establishing the “misuse” defense, the Morton Salt decision
also reaffirmed the Motion Picture position that the doctrine’s
application does not depend on an antitrust violation, expressly finding
it “unnecessary to decide whether respondent violated the Clayton
75
Act.” In short, misuse exists to prevent interference with the proper
implementation of patent public policy, a role independent of (although
perhaps over-lapping with) antitrust law’s objectives.
The separation of misuse doctrine enforcement and remedies from
antitrust law produced a number of important differences.
Procedurally, misuse is an exclusively defensive regime. Neither those
whose actions have not been challenged by the patent owner nor the
government have standing to affirmatively attack possible patent owner
over-reaching. Substantively, to prevail a defendant need only show the
action exceeds the scope of the patent right, not harm to the market
76
itself. Remedially, misuse only renders the specific action and the
related patent unenforceable. No damages can be claimed for actual
harms to either the individuals or the marketplace, nor can other
affirmative corrective actions be required.
In contrast, antitrust law permits (and contemplates) affirmative
77
claims by private plaintiffs suffering cognizable antitrust harm, whether
or not they have been challenged by the patent owner, as well as by
governmental authorities whenever they believe it necessary to prevent

73. Id. at 494.
74. Id. at 493.
75. Id. at 494.
76. Applying the foundational “beyond the physical or temporal scope of the patent”
misuse test creates substantial difficulties in practice. See infra notes 118–21 and
accompanying text; supra note 51.
77. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 60–69 (discussing standing and antitrust injury);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 16.
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78

harm to the market. Antitrust plaintiffs must, however, show that the
challenged action has a net anti-competitive effect on the overall
market, not merely that it exceeds the scope of the patent or causes
individual harm. Finally, the regime offers a much wider range of
remedial options allowing courts to match relief to specific harm.
Injunctive relief prohibiting and requiring actions as necessary to
79
prevent and repair interference with the market can be granted along
80
with damages in compensation for injury caused. A court must also
award exemplary treble damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees as
encouragement to private plaintiff enforcement and deterrence to
81
would-be violators.
Egregious per se violations also trigger the
additional deterrence of criminal sanctions, in the form of substantial
82
fines and jail time.
For the forty years following Morton Salt, the lower courts followed
the Court’s lead in treating misuse as distinct from and farther reaching
83
than antitrust law’s Rule of Reason net effects inquiry. Consequently,
the 1986 Federal Circuit decision in Windsurfing International, Inc. v.
84
AMF, Inc. surprised many by articulating misuse as “impermissibly
broaden[ing] of the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with
85
anticompetitive effect” (emphasis added).
The addition of the
anticompetitive effects requirement was clearly not inadvertent. It was
specifically reiterated when framing the misuse claimant’s burden as
follows: “[t]o sustain a misuse defense in a licensing arrangement not
held to have been per se anticompetitive by the Supreme Court, a
factual determination must reveal the overall effect of the license tends
to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined
86
market.”
Despite commentator criticism of Windsurfing as inconsistent with
78. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 15. Both the federal Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission have express statutory authority to enforce the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. Only the Federal Trade Commission can proceed under Federal Trade
Commission Act, § 5. State governmental authorities enforce state antitrust laws which are
not preempted. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 90.
79. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 50–58.
80. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 17.
81. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 58; HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 17.3.
82. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 45–46; HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 15.1a.
83. In Zenith Radio, the Court left even less doubt than in Motion Picture and Morton
Salt regarding misuse’s independence from antitrust law, stating that “if there was . . . patent
misuse, it does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of an [antitrust
violation].” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969).
84. 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986).
85. Id. at 1001.
86. Id. at 1002.
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the Supreme Court’s articulation of the misuse doctrine, subsequent
Federal Circuit misuse decisions have continued to apply its two-step
88
analysis. It must first be ascertained whether or not the challenged
action (generally a licensing requirement or limitation) broadens (seeks
advantage beyond) the physical or temporal scope of the patent’s
claims. If not, the action is per se valid. If the limitation or restriction
falls outside the patent’s scope it must then be determined whether it
“impermissibly” expands the patent right. Impermissible expansion
only occurs if (1) Supreme Court precedent has held the specific action
per se invalid, or (2) under the anticompetitive effects test it imposes an
89
unreasonable restraint on competition.
87. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 5, at 418–31 (noting the nod to precedent by
excepting the Supreme Court’s per se holdings and criticizing the addition of the
anticompetitive effects requirement in other situations); Hoerner, supra note 12, at 682–85.
These commentators (and others) make the fair point that the Windsurfing justification for
adding the requirement (“recent economic analysis question[ing] the rationale behind
holding any licensing practice per se anticompetitive,” Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1002 n.9)
finds no direct support in the case cited for the proposition, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971). That case only references the
Motion Picture/Morton Salt line of cases (discussed supra notes 54–74 and accompanying
text) and the restriction of a patent holders’ rights to the “physical or temporal scope of the
patent.” Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 343. However, although the Blonder-Tongue Court did
not explicitly mention “anticompetitive effects,” a strong logical connection can be found in
its analysis. The line of earlier misuse cases cited expressed serious concern with the adverse
market effects of the patent “monopoly” which connect directly to present day, albeit more
nuanced, antitrust doctrinal competition concerns. From that perspective the Federal Circuit
may merely have been doing an artful job of using its limited ability to cabin the adverse
effects of a Supreme Court doctrine that had outlived its usefulness. See Mark D. Janis,
Transitions in IP and Antitrust, 2002 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 253, 282 (2002) (noting the
Federal Circuit’s “grudging acceptance” of the Court’s precedent); infra notes 251–56 and
accompanying text (explaining the antitrust evolution justification for the Court’s overruling
its misuse precedents); Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 n. 2 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the need to follow the Court’s existing misuse precedents); id. at
1321 (noting the judge-made doctrine should not be applied “expansively”). Additionally,
although no certain inference can be drawn from a negative, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Windsurfing, 477 U.S. 905 (1986), meaning fewer than four of the Justices (if any)
found the case sufficiently aberrational to merit review.
88. See Princo, supra note 87; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868–70 (Fed. Cir.
1997). The Federal Circuit may have briefly backed away from Windsurfing in Senza-Gel
Corp. v. Seiffart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See Feldman, supra note 5, at 419–420;
Hoerner, supra note 12, at 673–74. However, Senza-Gel had not only an odd procedural
posture but involved tying, which being governed expressly by Morton Salt thus fell within the
exception expressly carved out under Windsurfing to the anticompetitive effects requirement.
That would also be consistent with the Federal Circuit citing to Senza-Gel when making the
point it remained bound by, and continued to honor, Supreme Court precedent. See supra
note 87. In all events, the Federal Circuit clearly has resolved whatever concerns it may have
had in favor of requiring anticompetitive effects whenever not explicitly prohibited by
Supreme Court precedent.
89. See id.; Janis, supra note 87, at 282–83.
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The Supreme Court has yet to address the Federal Circuit’s
“anticompetitive effects” test, having remained silent on the misuse
90
doctrine’s substantive requirements for some forty years. Congress has
acted twice, once before and once after Windsurfing. Neither action
provides definitive guidance regarding the Federal Circuit’s
anticompetitive effects test.
The first Congressional action, the 1952 codification of federal
patent law, acknowledged the existence of the Court’s misuse doctrine.
However, rather than expressly adopting and incorporating the Court’s
patent policy-based “exceeds the scope” test, Congress instead added
91
provisions limiting the doctrine’s application. Sections 271(b) and (c)
defining inducement and contributory patent infringement were
intended to override the doctrine’s threatened elimination of indirect
92
infringement liability.
Section 271(d) identified specific behaviors
which do not constitute misuse. In particular, responding to the Court’s
evolving per se “tying equals misuse” jurisprudence, it explicitly
confirmed a patent owner’s right to derive revenue from the sale or use
of components which constituted less than the whole, but a material part
of the invention.
The 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act came after Windsurfing and
offers better insight into Congressional thinking regarding the proper
role of anticompetitive effects in misuse. Once again the Act did not
adopt misuse. It only cut back on its judicial expansion. Section
271(d)(4) expressly precluded a misuse finding based solely on the
93
owner’s decision not to use or a refusal to license a patent.
The
legislative history indicates Congress intended the provision to codify
existing law, in effect confirming that misuse does not reach mere
94
exercise of the patent right to exclude.
New Section 271(d)(5) explicitly addresses anticompetitive effects
but only in a limited context. It requires an affirmative showing that “in
90. Not only did the Court deny certiorari in Windsurfing, 477 U.S. 905 (1986), but it
has only made a few indirect references to the doctrine since that time. See supra note 16.
91. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221–23 (1980); Charles
W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 369, 379–88 (2006); Mueller, supra note 8, at 674–76; Giles S.
Rich, Infringement under Section 71 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521
(1953).
92. The sections legislatively overruled the Supreme Court’s Mercoid decisions. In
those cases, the Court held a patent owner’s contributory infringement claims against
suppliers of components having no other non-infringing use constituted patent misuse.
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. MinneapolisHoneywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006).
94. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 199; Mueller, supra note 8, at 678–79.
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view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product” as a predicate to
finding misuse when a patent license is conditioned on “acquisition of a
95
license to another patent or purchase of a separate product.”
What Congress intended by the 1988 statutory changes is
ambiguous. Regarding tying, it certainly substantially restricted the
Morton Salt holding that insisting on use of goods falling outside the
patent’s claims constitutes per se misuse. The language does leave open
the argument that Congress was merely limiting the per se violation to
96
cases involving market power. The legislative record, however, makes
it far more likely Congress wanted the misuse determination to be
“guided by Supreme Court decisions in the context of unlawful tie-ins
97
under the antitrust laws.”
That means that whether or not tying
constitutes a per se violation will be determined by the Court’s evolving
98
antitrust analysis, not by misuse “scope of the patent” limitations.
In all events, Section 271(d)(5) clearly did not affirmatively adopt
the Federal Circuit’s much broader anticompetitive effects requirement.
Commentators convincingly argue that by failing to enact a
contemporaneous Senate bill which would have expressly required an
antitrust violation to find misuse, Congress intended to preserve the
99
doctrine’s independence. By not acting, Congress certainly left the rest
of the Court’s existing misuse doctrine intact. However, reading nonaction as freezing misuse in its then existing form (whatever that might
100
be) goes too far. The language of the Misuse Reform Act clearly did
not explicitly codify any particular version of misuse (including
whatever reading one might give to Supreme Court precedent). It
merely imposed limitations. The failure to affirmatively adopt an
“antitrust/competitive effects” standard does not constitute its
permanent rejection. It merely reflects the decision to leave in place the
95. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).
96. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 197–98.
97. Id. As Professor Calkins points out, those antitrust decisions may still trigger per
se liability (the Court’s antitrust tying jurisprudence is less than clear), but that would be a
result of the antitrust assessment, and not because an independent misuse rule has been
applied.
98. The Court’s split decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2 (1984), has left the antitrust per se-tying issue confused. See HOVENKAMP, supra note
27, § 10.3a.
99. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 193–200; Feldman, supra note 5, at 420–24.
100. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 425 (“The fact that Congress failed to approve . . .
an antitrust analysis left the Federal Circuit still lacking the authority to alter the doctrine in
this way, yet that is precisely what the court did in Mallinckrodt.”). Whether the Federal
Circuit had the authority to act as it did in light of Supreme Court precedent is a different
issue. See supra note 87.
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101

status quo. Regarding misuse, that status quo leaves control over the
doctrine with its originators and managers, the courts, subject only to
102
the specific legislative limitations explicitly required by statute.
Whatever Congress may have intended (or how flagrantly the
Federal Circuit may have flaunted that institution or Supreme Court
precedent) the “anticompetitive effects” inquiry remains the practical
103
reality at the coalface of judicial misuse determinations. As a result, it
is more productive to leave these technical legal issues aside for the
moment and address the antecedent underlying policy question: how
useful is the misuse doctrine in today’s world? That answer in hand, the
Court or Congress can readily make the doctrinal adjustments necessary
to produce the desired outcome, whether by directing the Federal
Circuit to drop its anticompetitive frolic, fine-tuning the doctrine’s
existing rules and remedies, or eliminating the doctrine entirely.
PART II: THE ARGUMENT FOR ELIMINATING PATENT MISUSE
A. The Current Situation–Why Worry?
Misuse proponents correctly argue that the Federal Circuit’s
approach substantially limits the misuse doctrine’s ability to constrain
104
Every patent owner action falling below the
patent exploitation.
101. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 198 (noting Senator Deconcini’s statement that the
rest of the misuse question was left to “address in the future”) and Feldman, supra note 5, at
424 (noting Senator Leahy’s statement that rejection of the broader Senate proposal “does
not mean that Congress has rejected” that position “and now believes that the traditional
misuse doctrine should be retained intact . . . . It only means that, because of the short time
available at the end of this Congress, the House and Senate Committees interested in these
issues were able to agree on a narrower reform.”).
102. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329–1330 (Fed. Cir.
2010). The Princo decision also makes apparent the futility of trolling through the
congressional history to discern greater limitations on court management of the doctrine.
Compare id. at 1331 with id. at 1332. Members of Congress undoubtedly had differing views
on the reach of the doctrine (to the extent they had any at all—see supra note 101 (noting
Senator Leahy’s point about the limited time available to devote to the issue)). Better to
stick to what the Act actually says and leave the rest to the courts. If Congress becomes
unhappy with the direction the courts take, it can make further adjustments. An additional
benefit of the status quo interpretation is it parallels the relationship between Congress and
the courts regarding antitrust law. That allows the two doctrines’ approach to patent power
to evolve in tandem. See infra notes 262–71 and accompanying text. The approach does
leaves the Federal Circuit constrained by existing Court precedent, but allows the Court itself
to make such changes as it deems appropriate. See supra note 87; infra notes 262–74 and
accompanying text (arguing the Court should use that power to eliminate the misuse doctrine
in its entirety).
103. See supra note 88 (citing the numerous Federal Circuit cases to the present in
which it has been applied, including the 2010 en banc decision in Princo, 616 F.3d 1318).
104. That concern has been considerably heightened by the Federal Circuit’s en banc
decision in Princo, 616 F.3d 1318. The majority expressly stated its intent to limit misuse,
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anticompetitive effects/antitrust standard, even those producing rights
well beyond the physical or temporal scope of the related patent, will go
unsanctioned.
Recent events make the concern more than theoretical. Patent
owners have moved well beyond demanding returns from products or
services outside the patent claims or for time periods after the patent’s
expiration.
Disruption of industry standards, reverse settlement
payments from patent owners to alleged infringers, non-producing
patent owners’ interference with others’ productive activities and
licensing terms limiting access to medical treatment and impairing
innovation raise serious issues about the proper scope of patent
105
exploitation. Efforts to address many of those issues through antitrust
law have been resoundingly rejected by the courts based explicitly on
106
the absence of demonstrable anticompetitive effects.
One can
reasonably suspect that the Federal Circuit’s heightened misuse
standard creates a serious enforcement gap.
In the existing efficiency driven legal paradigm, it is insufficient
merely to point out that misuse prevents patent owners from imposing
these costs on others. As a properly functioning patent law intentionally
limits third party access, it is necessary to determine whether the
107
challenged action creates net system harms. Additionally, misuse does
not come for free. It is frequently pled, vigorously discovered and
108
argued, and commonly appealed (albeit infrequently upheld).
That
direct expense, its uncertain application, and the draconian blanket
unenforceability sanction both impose significant social costs and put a
109
significant thumb on the scales in favor of refusing to deal, potentially
characterizing it as “a judge-made doctrine that is in derogation of statutory patent rights
against infringement.” Id. See also id. at 1342 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (stating that “evidently
the majority thinks it appropriate to emasculate the doctrine so it will not provide a
meaningful obstacle to patent enforcement”).
105. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund, Paper, A.F. of L. v. Bayer
AG (In re Ciprofloxacin), 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc denied, --- F.3d ----,
2010 WL 3464382 (C.A.2); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009); Schering-Plough Corp., v. FTC, 402 F.3d
1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (pharmaceutical reverse payments);
Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009)
(standards ambush). These cases indicate that antitrust doctrine could stand recalibration,
but the issue in the text is not whether antitrust currently does an adequate job, but whether
it cannot and thus justifies a separate misuse doctrine. See infra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the
point).
107. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Potenza et al., supra note 13, at 69.
109. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982)
(noting the effects of “debilitating uncertainty”).
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reducing patent access. The misuse doctrine must produce some unique
overall net improvement to justify its existence.
The next section discusses how patent use can produce costs in
excess of those inherent to the patent regime, justifying some form of
legal intervention. The following section looks at whether retaining an
independent misuse doctrine provides sufficient distinct benefits to
support its continued application, ultimately concluding that it does not.
B. Excess Costs from Patents
Early judicial decisions took a generous view of patent rights,
leaving wide latitude in how related licensing transactions could be
110
In net efficiency improvement terms, that approach
structured.
reflected a straight-forward calculation. Society having decided to grant
the patent owner the legal right to prevent all access by others, any
permitted access, whatever the terms, must produce social benefits.
Justice Holmes eloquently articulated the position his Motion Picture
dissent:
I suppose that a patentee has no less property in his
patented machine than any other owner, and that, in
addition to keeping the machine to himself, the patent
gives him the further right to forbid the rest of the world
from making other like it. In short, for whatever motive,
[the patent owner] may keep his device [the film feeder]
wholly out of use [citation omitted]. So much being
undisputed, I cannot understand why he may not keep it
out of use unless the licensee, or, for the matter of that,
the buyer, will use some unpatented thing in connection
with it . . . . There is no predominant public interest to
prevent a patented teapot or film feeder being kept from
the public, because, as I have said, the patentee may
keep them tied up at will while his patent lasts . . . . [I]f
the owner prefers to keep the pot or film feeder unless
you will buy his tea or films, I cannot see, in allowing him
the right to do so, anything more than an ordinary
111
incident of ownership.

110. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 178–80.
111. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519–20
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). It bears passing mention that Justice Holmes treatment of a
patent as a property right does not explore whether different rights may attach to different
kinds of resources and, in particular, the possibility that public policy (patent or otherwise)
may limit a patent owner’s “bundle of sticks,” including the right to impose conditions on
access.
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In short, having given the patent owner the unilateral right to
prevent all access, the owner’s decision to grant conditional access is
better than nothing and, consequently, legal constraints on increased
patent exploitation must worsen the public’s position.
The majority opinion in Motion Picture provides the response:
The [earlier Court decisions permitting ties] proceed
upon the argument that as the patentee may withhold his
patent altogether from public use, he must logically and
necessary be permitted to impose any conditions which
he chooses upon any use which he may allow of it. The
defect . . . springs from . . . [the] failure to distinguish
between the rights which are given to the inventor by the
patent law and which he may assert against the entire
world and rights which he may create for himself by
private contract, which, however, are subject to the rules
of general law, as distinguished from those of the patent
112
law.
As the majority points out, the logical flaw in the “some access is
better than none” analysis is its exclusive focus on the benefits side of
the equation. It is true that a patent impairs efficient market operation
by limiting access (the “rights given to the inventor by patent law”) and
patent owners are generally free to refuse to deal with others at all. It is
also true that any increased access produces some efficiency
improvement. It is not true, however, that every increase in access
produces a net improvement. That determination requires examining
the harms produced by the terms of access. If those harms exceed the
benefits then the transaction reduces efficient market operation overall
and should be legally prohibited.
In making the net assessment, the majority draws the important
distinction between the costs arising directly from the patent right to
exclude and those produced by “private contract”—the terms of access.
The former reflects the inherent costs of the existing patent system. A
patent owner doing no more than exercising the right to exclude—
preventing access by refusing to deal—causes only the harms built into
the regime. If that produces net inefficiencies, the problem lies
113
exclusively in the regime’s internal implementation. The appropriate
fix involves adjusting the regime’s standards governing issuance and

112. Id. at 514.
113. The right to unilaterally refuse to deal and the right to unilaterally decide not to
use a patent impose the only inherent harms from the patent right to exclude. See supra
notes 45 and 51 and accompanying text.
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rights and/or remedies, not sanctioning owners for doing what patent
law expressly permits.
Privately constructed terms of access can produce additional costs.
Those costs may be purely financial—a royalty paid for access. Or they
may arise from imposing other conditions on the licensee. As the
Motion Picture majority properly observes, such rights must be
examined to determine whether their harms outweigh the benefits
(including increased access).
114
That net efficiency determination is the purview of “general laws.”
The extreme example of a patent royalty extracted at gunpoint provides
115
a hyperbolic but instructive illustration.
General law requires all
market transactions comport with the efficient market assumption that
the exchange reflect the voluntary decision of rational economic actors.
Payments made under physical duress fail that requirement, so despite
the increased access to the patented invention, contract law renders the
transaction legally unenforceable. Other general law requirements,
such as fraud and antitrust law, similarly constrain the agreements
regarding terms of access when they produce harms in excess of
116
benefits.
Absent these general law constraints, increased access may, in
efficiency terms, be worse for society than no access at all. While the
latter merely produces patent law’s internal net system efficiency
improvement (additional innovation justifying the costs of reduced
access), the former can impose additional costs producing a net overall
efficiency decrease. Such transactions must be legally prohibited. The
question is whether misuse doctrine contributes to accomplishing that
117
goal.
114. General laws act as general limitations on every form of property ownership, a
point that apparently failed to make an impression on Justice Holmes. See supra note 111.
Their role, however, is not to ensure the related property regime’s “internal” balances
produce a net efficient outcome (in patent law the right to deny access and not to use oneself,
supra notes 45 and 51 and accompanying text), but to ensure the use of any resulting rights
does not impose additional costs.
115. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 126 (making the point and noting the ex ante
analysis leading to the result).
116. For example, a similar analysis would apply to a patent license obtained through
fraud. Although such a license increases access, its terms do not reflect a net efficiency
improvement (the licensee having been misled in some material way regarding the benefits to
be obtained thus violating the perfect information assumption), and it will be rendered
unenforceable by general laws addressing that requirement. Although it operates in the same
fashion, the key guardian of net efficient outcomes is antitrust law. That regime’s operation is
discussed infra notes 130–54 and accompanying text.
117. As discussed earlier, the Court also supports the Motion Picture holding by
reference to patent exhaustion. See supra note 54. Rather than providing independent
support for misuse, exhaustion targets the same concern (albeit in a more limited context,
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Before turning to that question, it should be noted that the above
analysis clarifies why misuse’s “exceeding the scope of the patent”
118
inquiry fails to provide either useful guidance or proper outcomes.
That approach presupposes that some licensing terms are inherently
“within” the patent right while others are not and that by distinguishing
between them, undue social harms can be avoided. But that assumption
is false. The only inherent patent costs, those technically “within the
scope of the patent,” are those arising from exercise of the right to
exclude—that is doing nothing more than refusing to use or license to
others. Ensuring that right produces optimal innovation outcomes
requires patents only apply to invention (the qualification inquiry) and
play a significant enough role in its production to merit the costs of
119
excluding others during the patent term. The “within the scope of the
patent” inquiry is therefore, entirely unrelated to the licensing terms
inquiry. In contrast, whenever a patent owner allows access, they have
done more than exclude and any related condition may produce
additional social costs. Consequently, regardless of their nature,
financial or otherwise, such terms lie “beyond the scope of the patent”
120
and must be assessed for undue harms. The misuse requirement that a
post-sale restrictions on patented devices) and thus its existence requires a similar
demonstration that it provides unique value in policing against excessive costs/improper use
of patent rights.
118. As Professor Bohannan succinctly states the point: although the scope inquiry
constitutes an “understandable attempt to ground the doctrine of IP misuse in IP policy,” it
provides “little guidance on determining what falls ‘within’ or ‘outside’ the patent grant” and
“produces both false positives and false negatives.” See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 19–20.
119. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 14–17; Chiappetta, Internet, supra note 39,
at 320–23 (discussing the role of alternative forms of incentives).
120. The Federal Circuits’ latest word on misuse in Princo, provides a useful
illustration of how easily the “scope of the patent” inquiry can lead to dramatically underidentifying problematic licensing terms. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The majority makes the following observation regarding the inquiry
into impermissible broadening of the patent grant: “[It] begins with substantial rights under
the patent grant ‘includ[ing] the right to suppress the invention while continuing to prevent
all others from using it, to license others, or to refuse to license, . . . to charge such royalty as
the leverage of the patent monopoly permits,’ and to limit the scope of the license to a
particular ‘field of use.’” [citation omitted]. Given that the patent grant entitles the patentee
to impose a broad range of conditions in licensing the right to practice the patent, the
doctrine of patent misuse ‘has largely been confined to a handful of specific practices . . . .’”
Id. at 1328–29. Starting by assuming the patent owner has “substantial rights” vastly
understates the potential problem. A patent only “inherently” gives its owner the right to
exclude others. Every effort to exploit that right must be assessed for adverse effects under
the circumstances. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The fact that in some, even
many, cases no undue harms will be identified, does not obviate the need to check; it is only
by inquiring in each case that the proper determination can be made. But that same logic
argues powerfully against per se violations based solely on “exceeding the scope of the
patent.” See infra notes 178–89 and accompanying text (making the point that standing alone
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court distinguish between conditions within and beyond the scope of the
patent causes significant confusion and distraction while serving no
121
useful purpose.
That understanding also defines the proper scope of the misuse
justification inquiry. Internal calibration errors, such as inadequate
standards for grant or an excessively long patent term, are internal
design flaws. Attempting to make the necessary adjustments through
misuse deploys an indeterminate doctrine to illogically punish a patent
owner for errors beyond his control. Implementation shortcomings
should be addressed through direct legislative modification of the
offending statutory provisions. If misuse has a useful role, it must come
from some special value it produces in controlling the exploitation of
properly calibrated patents.

post-term royalties are not necessarily harmful). And, ultimately, it argues for eliminating
the doctrine entirely, doing away with its artificial distinctions and focusing on the actual
effects of the particular licensing terms. See infra note 121. That may well be precisely what
the Princo majority, constrained by Supreme Court precedent, was seeking to do—by
expansively defining the scope of the patent right and requiring the harm come directly from
licensing terms gives misuse very little range of application. See supra note 104.
In all events, the Motion Picture majority had the point fundamentally correct, articulating
the crucial distinction as between “rights which are given to the inventor by patent law” (the
right to exclude) and those “rights which he may create for himself by private contract” (the
terms of access). Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 514
(1917). Unfortunately, the Court’s subsequent misuse jurisprudence failed to follow this
sound approach, ultimately framing misuse as involving those actions which extend the
physical or temporal scope of the patent. See supra note 51; infra note 123.
121. The problem is clearly visible in the Princo case. The majority found the harm
arose from an alleged separate agreement between two patent holders to license one patent
and suppress the availability of the other. As that collateral arrangement did not produce
anticompetitive conditions imposed in the resulting patent license, it “had no bearing on the
physical or temporal scope of the patents in suit,” no extension could occur and misuse did
not apply. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1340. The dissent vigorously protested that the agreement
protected the licensed patent from competition and therefore extended the scope of that right
(monopoly). Id. at 1342–1343. But the debate fails to advance what all agreed was the actual
concern—whether the patent licensing arrangement caused undue social harm. Forcing
courts to engage in a distracting and ultimately meaningless scope of the patent debate only
makes an already complicated inquiry more difficult. Moreover, the pointlessness of the
effort ultimately argues for eliminating the doctrine entirely–focusing the inquiry explicitly on
assessing the efficiency effects of licensing terms, rather than going through the charade of
labeling those which are found permissible as “within the scope of the patent.” The theatre
of the absurd discussion in Princo over whether misuse can be predicated on an “ancillary”
antitrust violation reinforces the point. See id. at 1336, 1354 (Dyk, J., dissenting). Misuse
proponents generally argue the doctrine should extend beyond antitrust law to fill gaps left by
that regime (see infra Part II.C.1). That they find themselves seeking to define the “exceeds
the scope of the patent” misuse trigger by anti-competitive effects makes the actual misuse
issue clear.
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C. The Argument against an Independent Misuse Doctrine
The Supreme Court clearly intended that misuse would apply
independently of violations of general law, most specifically antitrust
122
law.
The articulated purpose was to prevent patent owners from
extending their rights beyond the physical (claims) and temporal (term)
123
of the patent, thus avoiding costs beyond those necessary to “carr[y]
out [the] public policy adopted by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States ‘to promote the Progress of Science and the useful
124
Arts.’”
The judicial creation of a distinct, patent-policy based misuse
125
doctrine does not justify its continued existence. Within the efficiency
paradigm, a potential problem exists any time patent exploitation
generates costs exceeding those inherent in the patent right to exclude.
The law should provide appropriate mechanisms for reviewing such
126
actions and preventing those that produce net harms.
Preserving
misuse as the vehicle for doing so requires identifying some specific
value that only defensive application of the scope of the patent inquiry
and blanket unenforceability remedy can provide.
1.

The Antitrust “Gap” Justification for Misuse

The most frequent justification is made in the negative: because
numerous patent transactions escape antitrust sanction, misuse
examination fills an essential “gap” in that regime’s application.

122. In Motion Picture and Morton Salt, the Court expressly declined to determine
whether the identified harms to the competitive environment constituted an antitrust
violation. See supra notes 64–65, 75 and accompanying text. In Zenith Radio, the Court went
further, explicitly stating that misuse did not turn on the existence of an antitrust violation.
See supra note 83. Although recent Federal Circuit decisions include an antitrust-like
anticompetitive effects requirement, that court has confirmed that “patent misuse is viewed
as a broader wrong than antitrust violation . . . [that] misuse may arise when the conditions of
antitrust violations are not met” (C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (1998))
and “[t]he patent misuse doctrine, born from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, is a
method of limiting abuse of patent rights separate from the antitrust laws” (B. Braun Med.,
Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (1997)). Ironically, the most recent misuse decision,
Princo, 616 F.3d 1318, triggered the opposite argument—whether misuse can be found based
merely on an antitrust violation. See supra note 121.
123. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971).
124. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
125. If a change is appropriate, then conflicting Supreme Court precedent must be
addressed. But that is an easily resolved matter of mechanical implementation. See infra
notes 260–74 and accompanying text.
126. When that happens is not clearly identified under current misuse doctrine, which
was originally developed primarily in reaction to the (relatively) straightforward tying
requirements. See supra notes 54–74, 118–21 and accompanying text. But that problem
remains secondary to determining whether the misuse doctrine should exist at all.
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a. The Market Power Gap
The problematic gap is commonly attributed to antitrust law’s
127
“market power” requirement.
The argument runs as follows: most
patents face sufficient (frequently stiff) competition from alternatives.
As a result, their owners lack the power to cause antitrust competitive
harm and consequently fall below the antitrust radar. As a result, the
vast majority of owners can extend their patent rights without fear of
antitrust sanction. Misuse is necessary to avoid the resulting excess
social costs.
The first three statements are correct. Antitrust law does permit
many conditional patent transactions because the patent owner has
128
insufficient market power.
The last statement is not. The antitrust
market power is not a flaw in the system causing the regime to “miss”
harmful transactions. Rather it serves an essential role in ensuring
antitrust law fosters overall efficient market operation. Filling the gap
by prohibiting these transactions through an independent misuse
constraint does not prevent market harms. It interferes with an
assessment mechanism specifically designed to ensure the law advances
129
the overall system net improvement goal.
A brief review of the role of power in antitrust law provides the
130
explanation. At the far power extreme, Sherman Act Section 2
applies to individual market participants either holding monopoly
131
power or having a dangerous probability of acquiring such power. A
patent conferring such power triggers serious concerns and close
scrutiny imposing substantial constraints on exploitation.
Although misuse proponents do not identify the “power gap” with
Section 2, examining how it deals with potential patent exploitation
127. The more specific form of the argument is that antitrust law’s market power focus
makes it inadequately sensitive to patent policy concerns, in particular, ensuring compliance
with the claims and term limitations designed to prevent excessive costs and interference with
innovation. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 10, at 13–18; Feldman, supra note 5, at 400–01
(but also noting that even with market power, antitrust may provide insufficient constraint);
Mueller, supra note 8, at 654–56, 671–72 (also noting the focus of misuse is on expansion of
the patent grant, while antitrust focuses on anticompetitive effects in a relevant market). The
excessive costs and innovation impairment arguments are separately considered below in Part
II.C.2.
128. The Court having (properly) done away with the presumption that a patent
produces market power, in fact, makes this much more likely. See Ill. Tool Works Inc., v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43–45 (2006).
129. Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774–77 (1984) (pointing
out that the market power “gap” is “the sensible result of a purposeful policy decision by
Congress”).
130. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
131. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 6.
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harms provides useful insights into antitrust law’s basic approach.
Despite the fact that monopoly power poses a serious threat to market
efficiency, Section 2 distinguishes between acquiring/using such power
132
“on the merits” and the “monopolization” offenses. That distinction
reflects the key role net efficiency plays in all antitrust policy and
doctrine. Monopoly power is the ultimate motivation for market
competition and the logical consequence of its successful pursuit. Fining
and jailing the winners would considerably chill desirable market
133
behavior, including curbing enthusiasm for participating at all.
To
avoid that problem, antitrust “monopolization” violations require more
than a dominant market position or the reasonable possibility of
obtaining the same. It must be accompanied by a “predatory act”—
some interference with competition beyond the unavoidable
consequences of the monopolist’s own skill, foresight, and industry. The
latter permits capture of the returns from “winning on the merits”—for
example, by creating better products at lower costs or through a
134
legitimately acquired natural or legal advantage, including a patent.
The inevitable consequences exception precludes imposing antitrust
liability on owners of legitimately acquired patents merely for denying
access to others. Even when the patent produces monopoly power, a
unilateral, unconditioned exclusion produces no more harm than
expressly contemplated by patent law. To treat such refusals to deal as
an independent misuse violation would make nonsense of the patent
system. The appropriateness of that antitrust outcome has been
explicitly acknowledged in misuse doctrine, both by the Court’s
exemption of patent owner actions falling within the “physical and
135
temporal scope” of the patent and by Congress in Section 271(d)(4) of
136
the Patent Act.
When a patent owner goes beyond refusing to deal, antitrust law
assesses every condition for unjustified anticompetitive effects. When
monopoly power is present, anything beyond the “inevitable

132. See id. at 269–71.
133. See Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the charging of monopoly prices,
is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.”); U.S. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (criminalizing mere possession of a
monopoly would “not only be unfair, but contrary to the intent of Congress . . . [t]he
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he
wins”).
134. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’n Inc., 540 U.S. at 407; U.S. v. Grinnell Corp, 384 U.S.
563, 570–71 (1966); Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 430.
135. See supra note 123 accompanying text.
136. Codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006).
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consequences” of the patent, that is, merely refusing to deal, will
trigger significant Section 2 concerns. A violation will be found if no
offsetting efficiency justification is shown, something which has proven
138
exceedingly difficult for monopolists to do in practice.
As applied,
Section 2 enforcement arguably exceeds the limitations imposed by
139
misuse, preventing every net harmful use of a patent right.
Doctrinally, however, the antitrust approach is more consistent with the
system efficiency goal. Rather than focusing on the patent’s “scope,” it
examines the transaction’s actual market effects, permitting those few
arrangements that, even with monopoly power, produce a net overall
gain.
Understandably, the misuse proponents’ antitrust market power gap
argument focuses on the vast majority of patent owners who do not
meet the substantial Section 2 monopoly power requirements. As a
result, those potent antitrust restrictions do not reach, much less
prevent, actions by myriad patent owners who may cause significant
harm. However, those owners do not receive an antitrust free pass.
Those falling below the Section 2 power requirements remain subject to
140
141
Sherman Act Section 1 and Clayton Act Section 3.
137. Even a refusal to deal can be an antitrust violation if it is accompanied by a
predatory act. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985) (the termination of an existing relationship found predatory on the facts). But see
Verizon Commc’n, 540 U.S. at 409–10 (noting Aspen lies at the outer limits of liability).
Additionally, there has been off and on discussion of an antitrust “essential facilities
doctrine” which would address the clog on competition from legitimately gained advantage,
even absent a predatory act. See U.S. v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 283
(1912). But see Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410–11 (expressing considerable skepticism regarding its
existence or usefulness but not explicitly repudiating it); Mueller, supra note 8, at 655–56
(discussing other commentators’ proposals to use the essential facilities doctrine to address
industry standards capture and concluding (correctly in my view) that the courts are unlikely
to extend antitrust law along these lines). The essential facilities doctrine improperly ignores
that when a patent owner does no more than refuse to deal, it does not create any efficiency
harms beyond those inherent in the patent regime. If the patent regime is internally
inefficient, then we should adjust its rules of grant and rights/remedies. See infra Part III.B.1.
If it is efficient, but we desire outcomes different than those produced by an efficient market,
then we should address that issue directly. See infra Part III.B.2.
138. If monopoly power is present or likely to be obtained, virtually every condition
has the potential to “unnecessarily exclude,” and will require a substantial showing. In most
cases that will be impossible to do. See Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 430–31 (“It was not
inevitable . . . .”); U.S. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (1953) (“Yet they
are not practices that can be properly described as the inevitable consequences . . . .”), aff’d
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 6.4a.
139. If a monopolist can convince a court that the condition falls within the scope of
the patent, misuse would not apply even if it produced net harms to the marketplace. See
supra notes 118–21, 123 and accompanying text.
140. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
141. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14. The Federal Trade Commission can also proceed
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Sherman Act Section 1 applies to “every contract, combination or
142
conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade.” To be “in restraint of trade,” an
arrangement must both harm competition and have a net adverse effect
143
on efficient market operation. Although a small number of Section 1
per se violations exist, such as naked horizontal price fixing and market
divisions, the vast majority of arrangements undergo Rule of Reason
144
assessment.
Finding a violation under the Rule of Reason requires
demonstrating the challenged arrangement have some adverse effect
145
competition. If plausible adverse effects exist, the defendant then may
offer justification. Justification requires showing the restriction is
essential to, and the least restrictive means of, producing a specific
146
market efficiency improvement. If that cannot be done, the restriction
violates Section 1, whether or not the defendant has market power.
A properly justified restriction then undergoes net positive effects
assessment to determine if the identified efficiency improvements
147
outweigh the harms.
Market power plays a significant role in this
148
inquiry. If those involved control a large share of a relevant market,
the likelihood that power can be used to produce net negative outcomes
tips the balance in favor of finding an antitrust violation. However,
when competition sufficiently limits their ability to insist, the
under Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 U.S.C. § 45). Some question remains as to
whether that antitrust authority extends to situations which do not constitute violations of the
Sherman Act or Clayton Act (which are clearly included). See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, §
15.2.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
143. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (describing the operation of the
antitrust Rule of Reason).
144. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 5. The assessment occurs on a continuum
requiring varying levels of factual inquiry, including a quick look which can vary from a
“twinkling of an eye” to a more “sedulous” factual review. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v.
F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Ind. Fed’n of Dentists v. F.T.C., 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (the inquiry
turns on the specific circumstances of the case).
145. Inherently suspect restrictions may be deemed sufficiently problematic that harm
is presumed. See NCCA v. Regents, 468 U.S. 104, 110 (1984); Licensing Guidelines, supra
note 35. Other restrictions may necessitate a more detailed look at the restriction in the
specific market context to assess if it will produce any adverse effects. See supra note 144,
discussing the variability of the “quick look” inquiry. Misuse proponents point to this
antitrust law’s focus on competition as a separate rationale for an independent misuse
doctrine which focuses primarily on innovation. That issue is discussed infra at Part II.B.2.b.
146. See Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 353–54 (1982); Law v.
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998); HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 5.1c;
Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 35.
147. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (describing the antitrust Rule of
Reason).
148. See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 35, §§ 1.2, 1.32–1.33, 4; Licensing
Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4.3.

2011]

LIVING WITH PATENTS

35
149

determination can be left to the market’s invisible hand.
If the
arrangement produces net efficiencies (e.g., better products and/or
lower prices despite the competitive restrictions), demand will migrate
to the participants. If not, demand will move to better performing
alternatives.
Clayton Act Section 3 adds an additional nuance to the Section 1 net
effects inquiry regarding foreclosure effects arising from tying and
150
exclusive dealing arrangements.
A Clayton Act Section 3 violation
requires showing the arrangement’s effect “may be to substantially
151
The courts have
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”
treated that requirement as placing a modest thumb on the net-negative
outcome side of the Rule of Reason scale. Specifically, Clayton Act
liability can arise even when the direct effects of the defendant’s actions
do not produce net harms, but create overall problematic foreclosure
when combined with others’ actions, either in the aggregate or as
152
reflecting a market trend.
As a result, even relatively weak players
149. When a transaction is characterized as vertical, it receives much more circumspect
antitrust review. See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 27, at 567 n.48 (citing, among others, Judge
Richard Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) (to the effect that the Rule of Reason applied to
vertical agreements is “in practice it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability”)).
Reduced scrutiny does not, however, mean antitrust law ignores the possibility of harm. The
decision to permit vertical restrictions must still be based on an affirmative determination
that under the circumstances the restraint is a necessary element in producing sufficient
offsetting benefits to produce a net improvement. Market power plays an important role in
that decision. But as in other Rule of Reason assessments, the decision to permit a vertical
restraint based on lack of market power is not a gap in enforcement. It reflects the
affirmative determination that sufficient competitive alternatives exist to reasonably assume
that the restraint will in fact produce net overall benefits. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 15–16 (1977) (citing Chief Judge Posner’s decision below noting that attempts to
impose undue restrictions “would just drive the dealers into the arms of a competing
supplier”); Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52, n. 19 (1977) (“[W]hen interbrand
competition exists . . . it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market
power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the same
product.”). Vertical transactions involving end-users will receive yet more relaxed scrutiny as
they constitute the basic engine of the market economy. See Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525
U.S. 128, 137 (1998). But again, a failure to sanction reflects that on net, such transactions
produce more benefit than harm. See id. (rejecting application of a per se rule).
150. Professor Bohannan identifies foreclosure as the key issue in misuse situations.
See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 3 (identifying market efficiency/innovation adverse effects as
well as the need to ensure access to the public domain; also noting the latter justification
applies to non-patent regimes lacking patent law’s virtually absolute right to exclude, as
discussed supra note 10). As argued below in the text, identifying the foreclosure concern
does not justify misuse; that requires that misuse provide a better response than antitrust law
to the problem.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006).
152. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 10.9e (making the point that the relevant
inquiry is not the defendant’s share of market sales but the level of overall market
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can face antitrust prohibition when the overall market situation
produces substantial barriers to entry.
In setting the intervention threshold for Clayton Act Section 3
foreclosure concerns, the Court uses power/market share as a tool for
reaching a proper balance between avoiding foreclosure harms and the
153
benefits of aggressive competition.
As with other antitrust
assessments, the absence of power can tip the balance toward a net
benefits finding, allowing the arrangement to survive scrutiny because
competitive market forces can reliably determine whether the
arrangement is net superior to the alternatives.
Finally, the antitrust violation thresholds under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts reflect one important additional consideration. If bringing
and maintaining an expensive legal action is too easy or sanctions are
too quickly imposed, antitrust law can itself interfere with the aggressive
154
competition which drives market efficiency.
The thresholds must,
therefore, reflect a balance between avoiding actual or incipient harms
and permitting too-ready pursuit and sanction of “false positives” which
can unduly chill desirable activity.
Many patent transactions will meet neither the Sherman Act Section
1 nor even the, perhaps, lower Clayton Act Section 3 market power
requirements. Misuse proponents are, therefore, entirely correct that
antitrust law will permit many transactions which cause harms beyond
those inherent in the patent right to exclude. However, that does not
result from an inadvertent enforcement “gap” in antitrust law. Rather it
reflects an affirmative decision to accept harms when they produce net
improvements. Applying an independent misuse doctrine would indeed
foreclosure).
153. The courts presently require a significant showing of power or foreclosure to
intervene. In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the Court
indicated that a tying violation might require over a thirty percent market share, at least
absent showing of other market harms. Similarly, exclusive dealing violations currently are
rarely found when aggregate market foreclosure is under forty percent. See HOVENKAMP,
supra note 27, §§ 10.3a, 10.9e. Professor Bohannan makes the valid point that these levels fail
to prevent many incipient harms, most particularly foreclosure affecting innovation. See
Bohannan, supra note 10, at 21–24, 31–34. That does not make the antitrust outcome
“incorrect.” As explained in the text, the objective is not to prevent all harms, but to ensure
net benefits from restrictions on competition. In all events, even if antitrust law has it wrong
that does not alone justify misuse. If lower thresholds are necessary, recalibrating antitrust
law (including perhaps returning to the Court’s earlier views on exclusive dealing foreclosure
effects) is preferable to deploying the even less suitable misuse doctrine. See infra notes 159–
67 and accompanying text. The specific application to patent policy innovation concerns is
considered below in Part II.B.2.b.
154. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
226–27 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n. 17 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986).
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prevent the costs. But it would also deny society the related net
benefits, thus impeding the pursuit of the system objective of enhancing
155
overall market efficiency.
Moreover, by putting patent owners at a
disadvantage relative to other market participants (who would only be
subject to antitrust constraints), misuse unnecessarily undermines the
value of patents and the innovation incentive policies pursued by the
156
regime.
b. Antitrust Enforcement Uncertainties/Costs and Doctrinal/Remedial
Shortcomings
Commentators have also identified the practical uncertainty and
costs of applying the Rule of Reason as well as various doctrinal and
157
remedial antitrust insufficiencies, as justifying misuse.
Antitrust law is extremely fact intensive and its vague and complex
real world application requires substantial time and financial resources
from both private litigants and the public. These and other practical
considerations, such as standing requirements, frequently prevent
158
bringing or succeeding in an otherwise meritorious antitrust case.
Additionally, there are good arguments that the regime has moved
too far toward avoiding false positives and non-intervention. Current
doctrine imposes extremely stringent proof requirements on plaintiffs
159
with regard to pleading, proof and substantive showings.
The D.C.
160
Circuit decision in Rambus v. Federal Trade Commission and the
Federal Circuit decision in Princo Corp. v. International Trade

155. See supra notes 26–36. This straightforward analysis begs the question of how the
Supreme Court could have missed the point in its early cases establishing the misuse doctrine.
The answer is all in the timing. Those seminal cases were decided well before the Court had
established the more-nuanced net efficiency Rule of Reason inquiry in antitrust law. As such,
they are best understood as representing a temporary fix, holding the line until a more
refined analysis could be developed. See infra notes 262–66 and accompanying text.
156. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the innovation policy justifications for misuse).
157. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 9; Feldman, supra note 5, at 420 (noting the point
and citing to Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 793, 794 (1988)).
158. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 61–69 (discussing standing limitations); Cotter,
supra note 14, at 8 (making the point in connection with misuse).
159. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 595 (regarding proof of agreement); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–558 (2007) (pleading requirements to survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526
U.S. 756, 789 (1999) (regarding proof of competitive harm); Brooke Grp. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (regarding the recoupment requirement
in predatory pricing cases); supra notes 149, 153 (respectively discussing vertical restraint
review and the substantial the market shares and foreclosure required to prove a tying or
exclusive dealing violation).
160. Rambus v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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Commission provide two good misuse-relevant examples. In Rambus,
the defendant belonged to a trade group considering adoption of an
industry standard. The Federal Trade Commission found it violated the
antitrust laws by failing to disclose and then asserting patents it held
covering the standard ultimately adopted. The court of appeals
reversed. It found that the FTC had not demonstrated the necessary
predicate anticompetitive harm because its evidence did not eliminate
the possibility the standard might have been adopted even with full
162
disclosure.
That holding appears to impose a “but for” standard of
causation in antitrust cases; a burden of proof notoriously difficult to
163
carry.
In Princo, the defendant infringer alleged that the patent owner had
engaged in licensing practices which foreclosed competition in a
potential alternative technology. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
held that to prove misuse the defendant infringer must establish that the
action had anticompetitive effects. Applying antitrust principles, the
majority found that this required the defendant to present evidence
demonstrating that “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the . . .
164
technology . . . would have matured into a competitive force.”
That
means to prove a violation involving suppression of an as yet fully
developed technology, the proponent must carry the very substantial
burden of overcoming the myriad technical and commercial
165
uncertainties associated with moving from concept to viability.
These cases raise legitimate concerns that current antitrust law will
not produce the net benefit outcomes required of the regime. However,
these are errors of implementation, not policy. They call for bettering
aligning antitrust doctrine with its policy mandate, not revisiting the
goals themselves. Using misuse to accomplish these same ends would
166
involve not merely addressing the same cost/uncertainty issues, but
161. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
162. See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464–67.
163. See Michael A. Carrier, The D.C. Circuit’s Error in Rambus and a More Justifiable
Framework for Causation and Standard-Setting 13 (Apr. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586430 (criticizing the standard as too high a bar and
arguing for “legal cause” as a more workable alternative).
164. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1351.
165. See infra notes 210–11 and accompanying text (discussing the issue in connection
with the innovation-fostering justification for misuse). The dissent in Princo also made the
valid argument that the majority erroneously placed the burden of proof on the defendant
infringer in the first instance. See Princo, 616 F.3d 1318 at 1353–54 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
166. The absence of a clear justification guiding the “scope of the patent” inquiry also
makes misuse exceedingly complex, uncertain, and expensive in practice. See supra note 108
(discussing the expense); supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the practical
effects of applying the “scope of the patent” test).
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would require dramatic change in the doctrine’s fundamental
167
approach. Moreover, the result of even a successful effort would be to
create a doctrine largely paralleling and duplicating antitrust law.
Finally, it has been argued that the misuse blanket unenforceability
sanction both more immediately and effectively addresses the adverse
access effects of patent overreaching and provides stronger deterrence
168
reducing the problem in the first instance.
As others have cogently
explained, the doctrine’s lack of remedial nuance makes it far more
169
likely to over or under-react. Antitrust law provides for substantially
more flexible relief based on the actual harm. Injunctions and damages
address the adverse effects on individual participants and the market,
while mandatory trebling and criminal liability for the most egregious,
per se violations more appropriately calibrate deterrence to the specific
wrong.
2.

Patent Policy Justifications for Misuse

The alternative misuse justification points to the special role the
Court assigned misuse in Motion Picture and Morton Salt–ensuring
170
proper implementation of patent policy. The approach produces three
possible justifications: Misuse is essential to prevent (1) excessive
financial returns through escape from patent regime’s internal temporal

167. The “scope of the patent” inquiry would have to be significantly adjusted to avoid
prohibitions on transactions producing net benefits. See id. Moreover, its defensive-only
application and remedial approach would need to be reconsidered. See supra notes 76–82
and accompanying text; infra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.
168. See Chronopoulos, supra note 8, at 800–01 (making the argument in the industry
standards setting); Princo, 616 F.3d at 1354 (Dyk, J., dissenting). But see generally
Chiappetta, Standards, supra note 8 (arguing that standards setting requires more nuanced
remedies to avoid interfering with desirable private ordering).
169. See supra note 14.
170. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 187 (articulating the point rather than advocating it
and properly noting this is the “strongest argument”); Feldman, supra note 5, at 400; Mueller,
supra note 8, at 671–72; Potenza, supra note 13, at 96–99; supra notes 54–72 and
accompanying text (discussing Motion Picture and Morton Salt). It can also be validly argued
that antitrust law fails to consider important non-efficiency related harms, for example,
distributional outcomes or behaviors regarded as morally repugnant for non-efficiency
reasons. There are two related responses. First, those normative issues play little role (in fact
arguably no role) in current patent policy. If we want our patent law to pursue goals other
than economic efficiency, that requires a wholesale revisiting of goals falling well beyond
anything misuse can accomplish. See infra Part III.B.2. Second, other existing laws
specifically address those concerns, for example tax and social program regimes
implementing redistributional objectives and criminal statutes enforcing behavioral norms
despite related inefficiencies. Cf. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998). If
they are not producing the desired outcomes, we should expand our inquiry to examine the
larger legal picture rather than focus solely on adjusting patent law.
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(term) and physical (claims) cost mitigating limitations; (2) harms to
innovation inadequately addressed under antitrust law Rule of Reason
172
assessment; and (3) unjustified acquisition or assertion of patent
173
rights. Each is considered and rejected below.
a.

Excessive Financial Returns

The argument is straightforward: to ensure an appropriate net
beneficial outcome, patent law specifically restricts the right to exclude
174
175
to the claimed invention for a specified period of time. When patent
owners obtain financial returns beyond those limitations, they exceed
their due causing harms beyond those society has agreed to bear. That
reasoning captured the Court’s imagination in its seminal misuse
176
cases, leading to the formulation that actions exceeding a patent’s
177
scope constitute per se misuse.
This appealing analysis, however, fundamentally misconstrues the
operation of patent law’s claims and terms limitations. The Court
178
holding in Brulotte v. Thys Co. prohibiting all post-term royalty
obligations provides a good framework for demonstrating the
171. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 400, 436–39.
172. See id. at 400–01, 439–49; Potenza, supra note 13, at 98.
173. Commentary on misuse generally treats acquisition and assertion issues as distinct
concerns. Although that tracks the Court’s approach to misuse, a complete inquiry into
justifications must consider whether it adds value by preventing any use of the patent system
creating unjustified harms. See infra Part II.C.2.c (discussing improper acquisition and
assertion).
174. Infringement occurs when there is any making, use, sale, offer to sell, or
importation into the United States of the patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
That invention is defined by the claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
176. The Court’s early misuse decisions explicitly focused on confining patents to the
regime’s internal restrictions on returns, in particular to the patented invention as defined by
the claims. See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text. Professor Feldman takes the
Court’s argument to the important next step, focusing on why misuse is required to produce
that outcome. The argument starts from the proposition that “[w]here no market power
exists, antitrust would be unconcerned by extensions of the time or scope of the patent”
leaving an enforcement gap which can be usefully filled by the misuse doctrine’s automatic
prohibition on any conditions “beyond the scope of the patent.” See Feldman, supra note 5,
at 436–38. As discussed in the preceding section, antitrust law is concerned with such
extensions and prevents them when and only when they produce net efficiency harms. The
more precise issue, therefore, is whether the harms permitted by antitrust law net assessment
are inconsistent with patent policy. The possibility of excessive financial returns is examined
in the following text. Other harmful effects on patent law’s innovation objectives are
addressed in the following section.
177. See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text; supra note 123.
178. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), rehearing den., 379 U.S. 985 (1965).
The decision has been roundly criticized by commentators in the past, for much the same
reasons discussed in the following text. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 14, at 2 n. 18.
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problem. In Brulotte, the Court reasoned that imposing such a royalty
requirement constituted a “bald attempt to exact the same terms and
conditions for the period after the patents have expired,” projecting the
180
monopoly beyond the patent period. As a result the Court held postterm royalty requirements were per se misuse.
Patent law’s fixed term clearly serves to cap the patent owner’s
financial returns and related social cost of the right to exclude. The
Brulotte decision equally clearly assumes that for the term limitation to
have the desired cost-limiting effect it must act as an absolute
181
prohibition on royalty payments after the patent has expired.
Although the first statement is accurate, the second does not survive
scrutiny.
The “excessive returns” inquiry starts by determining the inherent,
and thus acceptable (or at least accepted), maximum payment for access
to a patent as contemplated by patent law’s “limited times” restriction.
Neither the Constitutional nor the statutory time limitation speaks in
terms of when return on the patent can be received. Instead they
restrict the period of time during which a patent owner can prevent
182
access/use by others.
The contemplated maximum financial return
and related social cost is, therefore, equal to the value to others of
accessing/using the patent during that period of exclusive control. In
“misuse” patent policy terms, that means excessive returns only exist
when a patent owner receives more than that value. The relevant
“extension of the monopoly” post-term royalty inquiry, therefore, is not
179. Professor Feldman uses this example in her discussion of the time and scope
extension financial returns problem. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 400, 436–39. The
argument starts from the proposition that such extensions could continue in perpetuity free of
antitrust objection in the absence of market power, meaning antitrust law effectively changes
the “patent rules to say that a patent lasts for twenty years, but the twenty-year limit only
applies fully to patent holders who have market power” and, therefore, “limiting the inquiry
to behavior that violates antitrust law ignores significant issues for patent policy.” See
Feldman, supra note 5, at 438. The argument is cogently made, but to clarify, antitrust law’s
Rule of Reason assessment would permit post-term royalties whenever the extension
produces net benefits, even if the patent owner has market power. See supra notes 34–37 and
accompanying text.
180. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32.
181. See id.
182. The Constitution provides that Congress may “secur[e] for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Section 271(a) of the Patent Act defines infringement as the
making, using, etc of the patented invention “during the term of the patent therefor.” 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). It can, of course, be argued that the Constitution and the statute have
it wrong, but that would make nonsense of the misuse “scope of the patent” inquiry.
Moreover, the efficiency arguments in the text indicate that if the incentive is to come from a
patent right to exclude, then fixing the term of the control, not when returns can be received,
produces the better net outcome.
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when payment occurs, but whether the discounted present value of the
aggregate royalty payments exceeds the value of accessing the patent
183
during its (remaining) term.
The market ensures that equivalence will always exist regardless of
when actual payment is made. In a hypothetical completely efficient
market, patent owners cannot “project the patent monopoly beyond the
184
patent period” because they lack the requisite power. Any attempt to
extract royalties exceeding the value of access during the term will push
licensees to the less expensive alternatives. When, as is more likely the
case, the patent owner has some (or even substantial) market power, a
surplus will be obtained. However, that surplus will not exceed the
extra value to licensees of using the invention over the alternatives
185
during the period they are legally denied access.
Any attempt to
obtain more will make the otherwise less satisfactory alternatives
competitive, causing potential licensees to forgo the patented solution.
Any “monopoly surplus” will, therefore, equal the return (and incentive
186
to invent) contemplated by patent law’s “limited time” restriction.
In the absence of excess financial returns a misuse prohibition of
post-term royalties causes affirmative social harm. By unnecessarily
limiting flexibility in private-ordering regarding timing of payments, it
prevents licensing arrangements involving non-conforming financial
circumstances (for example, using time payments as a financing

183. The total absolute amount of royalties paid will vary depending on timing, with
longer payouts generally exceeding shorter term payouts in the aggregate amount. Those
differences, however, reflect deferred payment considerations such as time-value of money
and uncertainty/risk allocations. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Brulotte makes these points. See
Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
184. As the Court recently discussed in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28, 41–45 (2006), the early misuse cases confusingly use the market power term
“monopoly” to identify patent exclusivity. That was not, however, inadvertent. The misuse
cases, including Brulotte, were specifically concerned that patent owners would distort the
market by using the power afforded by their patent. See Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32 (“We are . . .
unable to conjecture what . . . resultant arrangement might have emerged had the provision
for post-expiration royalties been divorced from the patent and nowise subject to its leverage.”
(emphasis added)).
185. Justice Harlan’s dissent provides a helpful analysis along these lines. See Brulotte,
379 U.S. at 36–38 (Harlan J., dissenting). The more likely explanation for Brulotte is the fear
of patent power before antitrust filled the gap. See infra notes 263–66 and accompanying text.
186. This analysis identifies an important remedial issue. Post-term royalties are later
payment for value already received (the value of access to the patent during its term).
Consequently the post-term failure to pay should likely be treated exclusively as a damages
matter. Granting an injunction prohibiting practicing the invention would produce in
terrorem leverage related to sunk costs and prevent competitive use despite the clear
indication that money provides a sufficient remedy. See infra note 290. Only if other
considerations are in play would an injunction be appropriate.
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mechanism or tool for allocating uncertainty risks) and individual
188
preferences (use now, cash later). That, in turn, unduly restricts access
and exploitation of the patented invention, producing unjustified
189
inefficiencies.
Moreover, imposing these unjustified limitations on
exploitation of patented inventions makes them less competitive than
unpatented alternatives. The resulting impairment of the regime’s
incentives needlessly (and ironically) interferes with the very patent law
promotion of innovation policy misuse purportedly exists to protect.
Interestingly, the Court’s assessment of non-tying extensions of a
patent’s physical scope came out very differently. In Zenith Radio
190
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. the Court considered a royalty
computed based on the licensee’s total sales, including products not
incorporating the patented invention. Under Morton Salt, the attempt
to obtain payment based on matter “not embraced in the invention”
191
should have been per se misuse.
Instead the Court permitted
flexibility in structuring, holding that “if convenience of the parties
rather than patent power dictates the total-sales royalty provision there
187. Professor Feldman makes the additional argument that post-term payments may
permit the patent owner to extend the time-limited opportunity to obtain returns as, for
example, when the market is not yet ready to appreciate the invention’s value. See Feldman,
supra note 5, at 445. But as explained in the text, potential licensees will only commit to postterm royalties equal to the value of access during the patent term. That calculation will
reflect both timing benefits and risks. Only if obtaining access during the term provides
sufficient value (for example, reduced present cash flow, head-start, market share capture)
will a licensee sign on, and then only for the value obtained from access prior to expiration.
Otherwise, they will wait until the patent expires.
188. The argument might be made that if post-term royalties are prohibited, rather
than forego these transactions, patent holders will simply reduce the price to get whatever the
licensee is willing and able to pay during the term (something is better than nothing). Cf.
Feldman, supra note 5, at 448 (noting the choice, not arguing the point). But that is not how
the market and the patent system interact. In a fully competitive market, the royalty rate will
reflect the lowest profitable price. Consequently, rather than produce incremental returns,
additional sales at lower rates will not only produce an economic loss but adversely affect the
return on all licenses to the extent the owner cannot effectively discriminate. If power
produces a premium, the patent owner will structure its license output to maximize its return
in light of demand. Again, additional lower-cost transactions generally will not only fail to
produce incremental gains, but harm the owner’s overall return. In the messy real world,
such reductions will, of course, occur and produce extra access. But that does not justify
imposing barriers to flexibility which can produce yet further improvements.
189. Post-term royalty obligations do have foreclosure effects on competitors, both
existing and potential new entrants. A rational licensee will consider those effects from their
perspective (incorporating the effects on their freedom to change) and insist on related
concessions (such as optional outs or reductions in price). However, power may preclude
getting the desired concession and, in all events, merely because a term benefits both parties
does not mean it causes no social harm. See infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing foreclosure and
related effects on innovation).
190. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
191. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
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is no misuse of the patents and no forbidden conditions attached to the
192
In short, misuse requires the patentee to have used “the
license.”
193
power of his patent to insist on a total-sales royalty.”
Stated
affirmatively, when the licensee voluntarily accepts a royalty formula
extending the physical scope of the patent, not only is there no per se
194
misuse, but there is no misuse at all.
The Court’s Zenith Radio analysis can be readily connected to the
logic against treating post-term royalty payments as misuse. A licensee
will voluntarily accept (and may even propose) the administratively
cheaper total-sale royalty provision when it does not impose overall
costs exceeding the value of gaining access to the claimed invention.
The Court, however, failed to go the next step. The focus on patent
power obscures the fact that even when “coerced” a total sale royalty
195
will not produce excess royalty returns.
Even under market power
pressure no rational licensee will agree to pay more in aggregate than
196
Although
the value of obtaining access to the patented invention.
they will accept a surplus over the alternatives, that surplus will not
exceed the market value of the patented invention’s superior
performance over those alternatives. If it does, they will move to the
alternatives. Any surplus produced by a “beyond the claims” royalty
formula will merely reflect the incentive that patents are expressly
192. See Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 138 (citing to the rationale of convenience and
efficiency in royalty computation acknowledged in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 399 U.S. 827 (1950)). The Court, perhaps rethinking its ringing per se finding
in Brulotte, noted that case was not to the contrary as it only “articulated in a particularized
context the principle that a patentee may not use the power of his patent to levy a charge for
making, using, or selling products not within the reach of the monopoly granted by the
Government.” Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 136–37.
193. Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 139.
194. Id. at 135, 140. Reading the Court’s holding regarding the absence of
power/coercion in the misuse context as indicating in such circumstances resulting terms are
always per se valid goes too far. As implied by the Court’s analysis and as discussed below in
the text and infra notes 218–25 and accompanying text, every licensing term must undergo an
antitrust assessment.
195. The holding in Zenith Radio does not explicitly make a total sale royalty imposed
through power/coercion per se misuse, but it might fairly be interpreted as implying that
outcome. The Court’s focus on power and its adverse effects is not surprising. It is consistent
with the reasons it developed misuse. That concern is now better addressed by modern
antitrust law, making the power/coercion versus voluntary “misuse” distinction drawn in
Zenith Radio as irrelevant as the doctrine itself. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying
text.
196. The same “no harm” argument has been made regarding the impossibility of
excess financial returns from tying. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 16–17 (discussing the
discrediting of the dual monopoly theory); HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, at 10, 36;
HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 8.3c. That is not to say that licensees (and licensors for that
matter) will not make mistakes. But that problem is distinct from the argument that such
arrangements always impose excess costs and, therefore, justify per se prohibition.
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designed to produce. As with post-term royalties, treating total sales
royalties as misuse, to say nothing of a per se violation, merely because
they exceed the patent’s claims unnecessarily reduces beneficial
flexibility in licensing transactions. That, in turn, artificially constrains
access, reducing patent returns and impairing the regime’s incentives to
innovation.
Preventing licensing terms exceeding patent law’s term and claim
limitations to avoid excessive “internal” financial returns not only fails
to justify misuse, it raises serious concerns about the doctrine’s efficacy
197
in application. However, that does not conclude the matter. Access
conditions can have other kinds of adverse efficiency effects. Post-term
and total sale royalty obligations interfere with migration to
alternatives. Additionally, patent returns need not be received as cash
payments. They can impose limitations on licensee behavior (for
example restricting sourcing or research and development activities).
Although for the reasons explained above, such restrictions will produce
an equivalent transactional “price” (and return), they can raise other
concerns, in particular those articulated in the second patent policy
justification for misuse, adverse effects on innovation.
b.

Harm to Innovation

This patent policy justification derives directly from the Court’s
early misuse reference to the regime’s constitutional mandate that
patents should only impose social costs essential to progress the useful
198
arts–that is, spur innovation.
Unquestionably patent licensing terms
can adversely affect innovation. Post-term and total sales royalties and
minimum use and exclusivity requirements reduce market demand for

197. The internal balances analysis reinforces the fundamental difficulty with misuse’s
“scope of the patent” test. Because it does not accurately reflect the crucial difference
between inherent costs from refusing to deal and the potential harms arising from any term
imposed on access, it will both over-react (the beyond the term and claims per se violations)
and under-react (failing to consider conditions on access found to be within the patent’s
scope). See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text (discussing the early misuse cases).
Although the Court’s seminal misuse decisions do explicitly reference patent law’s innovation
promotion goals, the cases focus on ensuring that patent owners do not exceed the “scope of
the patent” as defined by their invention; that is, they do not obtain rights or impose costs
beyond those necessary to the regime’s promotion of innovation. Proponents of the
innovation justification discussed in this section seem to go a step further, arguing that the
Court sought to protect future innovation itself. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 401, 431, 445–
49; Potenza, supra note 13, at 98–99. See also Bohannan, supra note 10, at 1–4, 20–22 (noting
that innovation is one justification offered for the doctrine). Whether or not that latter
argument finds technical support in the Court’s misuse decisions, it makes sense to inquire
into whether it can support misuse.
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new products. Agreements not to develop alternative offerings or
improvements and grant-back provisions prevent or reduce research
and development by those perhaps most motivated and particularly
well-suited to do so. Tying provisions can impair new entry/improved
performance in the primary market and stifle innovation in adjacent
markets.
Reach-through royalty stacking burdens upstream
implementations and new developments, including extensions into new
markets.
Antitrust law examines every licensing term for net adverse
199
efficiency effects including those identified above.
The innovation
justification for misuse must therefore identify some way the antitrust
inquiry fails to sufficiently address patent policy innovation concerns.
200
That argument can take two somewhat overlapping forms. The pure
form treats promoting innovation as an independent goal, something
201
pursued apart from all other considerations.
That would make
antitrust law’s willingness to trade-off harms to innovation to obtain
other benefits entirely inappropriate. The second accepts antitrust law’s
net outcome approach but argues its doctrinal application inadequately
addresses innovation concerns.
The pure “no trade-off” position is untenable. Pursuing innovation
at all costs would put patent law at odds with the overall system goal, a
goal the regime’s own internal structure clearly reflects. Absolute
priority would require foregoing net improvement transactions, thus
affirmatively moving the market away from, rather than toward, the
202
goal of maximum operational efficiency.
Even patent law, which
199. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
200. Commentators making the innovation argument are not precise in their concerns,
both articulating innovation as a distinctly important goal of the patent system (and therefore
perhaps having primacy and exempting innovation harms from Rule of Reason net effects
assessment) and arguing that some innovation harms escape antitrust notice (perhaps as a
consequence of the market power gap, perhaps because antitrust law fails to give proper
attention to innovation concerns (either failing to see them or failing to give them extra
weight)). See Feldman, supra note 5, at 401, 431, 445–49; Potenza, supra note 13, at 98–99.
See also Bohannan, supra note 10, at 20–22 (noting innovation as one aspect of the doctrine’s
justification). The various arguments are discussed in the following text.
201. No one appears to rely on the pure argument; it is included only for completeness.
Cf., Potzena, supra note 13, at 99 (arguing that antitrust fails to address “stifling of innovation
in an unfair manner” implying perhaps that innovation deserves at least some level of
preferential treatment).
202. See supra Part I.A (discussing the integrated system effort required to align the
real world with the efficient market theory). The Court’s misuse holdings are consistent with
the position in the text. They do focus on patent policy and, in particular, the regime’s
objective of promoting the useful arts, but rather than arguing for progress of the useful arts
at all costs, they impose limitations designed to ensure patent law incentives cause no
unmerited harm to the market. See supra note 198.
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exists primarily, if not exclusively, to foster innovation, explicitly rejects
the innovation first approach. Its internal rules are explicitly designed
not to maximize innovation at all costs, but to produce optimal
203
incentives in light of the countervailing costs.
The second argument, that antitrust assessment does not properly
consider innovation concerns, also comes in a pure and more nuanced
form. The pure form–that antitrust entirely fails to consider innovation
at all–can be quickly dismissed. Even assuming antitrust law constrains
204
Rule of Reason inquiry to harm to competition, interference with
innovation easily qualifies. Innovation plays a particularly critical role
in market competition, producing the essential elements of the invisible
hand—alternative offerings, improved functionally, and lower
production and distribution costs. Every term impeding the ability to
205
innovate will be taken seriously by antitrust law.
If an antitrust insufficiency exists, it must arise from a specific
deficiency in actual application. Proponents have raised a number of
related arguments. The most common identifies antitrust law’s alleged
“market power gap” as the culprit, arguing that it causes antitrust law to
206
permit many transactions that interfere with innovation. The reasons
207
for dismissing that argument in its general form discussed earlier
provide a useful starting point for addressing it in the innovation
context. Every licensing term, including those harmful to innovation,
triggers antitrust analysis. Some (even many) survive review because
the patent owner possesses insufficient market power. That is not
because antitrust law failed to give innovation its due. Rather, it reflects
a finding that despite the innovation harms, the transaction produced a
net efficiency gain under the circumstances. Treating these transactions
differently merely because they involve innovation constraints would
203. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
204. Antitrust law’s focus on market “competition” does not mean it only considers
direct impediments such as agreements not to compete. Net “competition” assessment is
broadly read to reach anything that may impair or improve effective operation of the invisible
hand, including transactions costs, foreclosure effects, and information asymmetries. See
supra notes 34–37, 146 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 33, § 1.5c; Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (discussing the need in antitrust law to
“safeguard the incentive to innovate”).
206. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 4, 20–22; Feldman, supra note 5, at 446–47;
Potenza, supra note 13, at 98–99. If the reason for giving primacy to innovation involves nonefficiency goals (for example, protection of the small inventor or preventing “morally”
reprehensible interferences), those justifications involve fundamental changes to the existing
efficiency paradigm and are better addressed directly rather than through the misuse label or
adjustments to existing legal doctrine. See infra Part III.B.
207. See supra Part II.C.1.a.
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produce two unmerited consequences. First, it would mirror the
“innovation first” position, thus moving the overall system and patent
law away from their goal of maximizing efficient market operation.
Second, it would treat patents less favorably than alternative offerings,
thus affirmatively interfering with, rather than promoting, patent law’s
innovation agenda.
A more specific variation on the market power argument focuses on
208
“incipient” harms to innovation.
Exclusive dealing transactions
provide one good illustration. Even when few have adopted the
approach, the limitations imposed can nonetheless restrict ready access
to necessary inputs and markets by smaller or more locally constrained
innovators. Another example involves ensuring appropriate protection
for emerging technologies having unclear and uncertain paths to success
209
because of development and market risks.
Misuse proponents correctly point out that although antitrust law
identifies and considers these foreclosure problems, their limited or
uncertain effects can lead the courts to find no sufficiently demonstrable
210
harm.
As a result, no net outcome assessment will be made, letting
potential harms to innovation slip through the antitrust net. Again,
mere lack of antitrust prohibition does not justify misuse; the latter
doctrine must improve the situation. Making that determination
requires exploring the reasons behind current antitrust law nonintervention.
An appropriate legal response to limited or
incipient/uncertain harms to innovation must do more than identify such
harms exist. It must effectively deal with the costs of prohibiting the
challenged restrictions. The current antitrust proof of harm standards
and incipiency thresholds do this by considering the adverse effects of
too ready legal intervention as part of the net benefit assessment
211
process. That requires setting the bar sufficiently high (and absorbing
some related innovation harms at the margin) to prevent legal claims

208. See Bohannan, supra note 10, 27–35; Feldman, supra note 5, at 447–48 (antitrust
law focuses on anticompetitive effects on particular markets; patent policy concerns extend to
“system-wide effects that may hinder the overall progress of science”). The “incipiency”
problem is not unique to innovation; it raises difficulties for every plaintiff seeking to
demonstrate cognizable antitrust harm exists. See supra notes 153–54, 159 and accompanying
text.
209. The protection of nascent technologies was a central issue in Princo. Princo Corp.
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The majority specifically found that
the defendant infringer’s failure to prove that a potentially competitive, but as yet
undeveloped, technological alternative was sufficiently viable to raise antitrust
anticompetitive concerns. Id. at 1334–1335; see supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 208.
211. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
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which are too easily made from chilling desirable vigorous market
competition.
Current antitrust doctrine likely does not adequately perform this
212
delicate balancing act. But once again, the misuse doctrine’s defensive
only application, poorly calibrated “scope of the patent” inquiry and
blanket unenforceability lack the necessary nuance to provide a useful
alternative solution. Although we might make adjustments to misuse,
they would go well beyond tinkering with its doctrinal implementation
213
to revisiting its overall structure. The existing antitrust shortcomings
regarding harms to incipient innovation are better addressed within the
approach and experience of that regime.
Professor Feldman offers an interesting variation on the “incipient
214
harm” concern in her discussion of Reach-Through Royalties.
Such
provisions provide patent owners returns from products developed by
the licensee through use of their patents. The arrangement allows
licensors and licensees to share the risks of research and development
investment by predicating returns on successful outcomes. As such,
they increase access and use of the patent. However, they also create
remote and potentially numerous down-stream rights-holders. That
fragmentation of rights can create anti-commons type interference with
“efficient exploitation of the [follow-on] invention” thus impairing
215
innovation.
Again, antitrust law’s net effects approach takes these
adverse effects on innovation into account, but also considers the gains
216
When an arrangement produces a net
from improved access.
improvement, permitting the transaction advances both the overarching
system goal and patent policy.
If current antitrust doctrinal
requirements fail to produce this outcome, the appropriate response is
to adjust its rules, not apply the even less effective doctrine of patent
217
misuse.
212. See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text (discussing the likely over-concern
with false positives).
213. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
214. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 439–48.
215. Id. at 447.
216. See supra notes 174–97 and accompanying text (discussing the same access issue in
connection with post-term and total sale royalties).
217. The conclusion in the text does not mean patent rights fragmentation and anticommons concerns are not serious problems. It only argues that misuse does not provide the
appropriate response. The problem arises from patent law’s virtually absolute right to
exclude as the mechanism for providing incentives to invest in innovation. When patent
owners holding such rights employ net efficient mechanisms for increasing access, they
promote rather than hinder the overall system goal. It makes no sense to take such owners’
patents away from them. If the joint patent and antitrust law outcome does not produce what
we desire, that shortcoming should be addressed directly. If the problem lies in
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The final variation argues antitrust law’s market power focus creates
218
Many antitrust
a “blind spot” regarding voluntary transactions.
opinions focus on power/coercion as the touchstone for finding a
219
violation. That may mean that the regime will fail to consider harms
to innovation caused by terms willingly accepted by licensees.
The response both reinforces that the antitrust approach is superior
to misuse, doctrinally and as a matter of policy, and demonstrates why
220
the voluntary transaction concern is a non-issue.
To trigger misuse,
the patent holder must first assert the patent, substantially limiting the
doctrine’s ability to address and rectify innovation concerns arising from
voluntary transactions. For example, if mutually agreed total-sales
royalties are causing foreclosure, non-infringing competitors seeking to
open the market to a non-infringing offering have no misuse standing to
complain. The existing licensees, who have taken those effects into
account when deciding to enter into the agreement, are unlikely to feel
challenging the requirement merits the associated costs and risks
(including to the licensor relationship), particularly as misuse gives them
no right to any monetary compensation. Additionally, if misuse
ultimately renders the patent unenforceable, the licensee and the overall
market may find the now royalty-free patented invention more
attractive then the alternatives, actually increasing the barriers to the
new entry by innovators.
Antitrust challenge is far more likely and effective. Anyone harmed
by the related impairment of competition can challenge the
arrangement, including innovators suffering foreclosure effects on their
221
alternative offerings. Additionally, the federal or a state government
agency may bring an action, either in response to a private complaint or
implementation, we should make the related adjustments. If it arises because we desire
something other than efficient market outcomes, we should expressly add those
considerations to our antecedent normative debate. See infra Part III.B.
218. Cf. Feldman, supra note 5, at 447–48 (raising a concern in connection with the
Court’s focus on “coercion” in Zenith Radio, a misuse case).
219. The Court’s focus on market power is a proxy for the ability to coerce by escaping
the constraints of competition. See supra notes 149, 153, 195 and accompanying text. See also
Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 35 (discussing the Guidelines which use the absence of
power as a safe-harbor).
220. See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text (describing the differences in
approach); supra note 14 (noting commentators making the remedial superiority point).
221. Professor Bohannan raises the good question of whether alleged foreclosure of a
new product not yet introduced (or even developed) is sufficient to give its developer
antitrust standing. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 35. Cf. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1350 (Dyk, J.,
dissenting; noting the related problem of proving damages). However, for the reasons
discussed in the text, in the likely event antitrust standing is not appropriately calibrated the
appropriate response is to make changes to those rules, not application of the even more
poorly calibrated misuse doctrine.
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on its own initiative. The sanctions for violation will include an
injunction requiring adjustments to the terms of access (which likely will
be less than making the patent available royalty-free to all) and
compensatory damages. Moreover, mandatory treble damages and the
grant of reasonable attorneys’ fees provide substantial incentives to
bringing private actions and, together with fines, provide considerable
deterrence to a patent owner imposing over-reaching access restrictions
in the first instance.
On the merits, antitrust law subjects all agreements to Rule of
222
Reason assessment. That an arrangement was entirely voluntary (or
mutually beneficial) neither exempts it from review nor dictates the
outcome. The efficiency review focuses on net market effects, not
participant desires. Antitrust law’s application to horizontal price fixing
223
and market divisions provides a ready example. The parties to such
agreements affirmatively seek the individual benefits of limiting
competition between them. However, to survive antitrust review they
must demonstrate the arrangement is an essential element in producing
224
a net market efficiency improvement. If they cannot, the transaction
will constitute a per se violation triggering treble damages and in many
225
instances criminal sanctions.
In such cases, the agreement falls not
merely despite the parties’ voluntary agreement and their desire to
obtain its benefits but in large part for those very reasons.
Patent transactions are similarly assessed. If a term adversely affects
innovation, it must be justified by showing a net overall improvement in

222. See supra notes 34–37, 145–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule of
Reason). Interestingly, misuse raises a potentially even more serious problem, exempting all
conditions, whether voluntary or involuntary, which fall within the scope of the patent. See
supra notes118–21 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with the scope of the
patent inquiry).
223. See Sullivan, supra note 36, § 1.5a.
224. In the early days of Sherman Act § 1 enforcement, defendants did attempt to
argue the individual benefits defense, albeit articulated in “system” terms, such as avoiding
the damaging effects of cutthroat competition, guaranteeing fair (reasonable) returns and
preserving future capacity. The courts rejected those arguments, focusing instead on efficient
market operation as the means for producing the appropriate outcomes. See U.S. v. SoconyVaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 292 (1927);
Sullivan, supra note 36, §§ 5.3e, 5.3f. See also AREEDA, supra note 27, at 115–19.
225. In fact, in such cases, no showing of market power is required. See Socony, 310
U.S. at 845 n. 59 (finding it was “the illegal character of the restraint not the amount of
commerce affected” and a violation exists “though it is not established that the conspirators
had the means available for accomplishment of their objective”). Although Socony was the
high water mark of per se liability, those rules still apply to naked (unjustified) horizontal
price-fixing and market divisions. The Department of Justice aggressively pursues such
arrangements and significant sanctions are imposed, including jail time for the individuals
involved.
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market performance. If that cannot be done, the term violates antitrust
law despite its voluntary and mutually beneficial nature.
In summary, whether the patent transaction is coerced or voluntary,
whether the harm is existing, incipient or uncertain, antitrust law
identifies and addresses all actual or potential adverse effects on
innovation. Imposing antitrust sanction, however, requires such effects
must be harmful on net to efficient market operation, both in light of
the benefits produced and the chilling effects of overly aggressive legal
intervention. To the extent existing antitrust doctrine does not produce
that outcome, the problem is an implementation short-coming, not one
of approach. Attempts to rectify such problems through misuse would
require a far more complex, time-consuming, and expensive effort
merely to create a duplicative cause of action.
c. Unjustified Acquisition or Enforcement of Patents
A conditioned licensing transaction at least provides the benefit of
increased access. In contrast, the unjustified acquisition or assertion of
a patent is undesirable by definition. The law recognizes the difference
and has developed separate doctrines addressing these special patent
concerns. A gap in their application might justify a distinct misuse
226
doctrine.
i.

Improperly obtained patents.

Limiting issuance of unjustified patents is a substantial concern of
any patent regime. Such patents produce no social benefit and all
related costs are inherently excessive. Even if never asserted, their
existence causes distortions in market behavior, requiring inquiry into
their scope and validity, which triggers attempts to design around and
causes foregone use, for fear of infringement.
Many “bad” patent problems involve patent applicants who follow
the rules but because of improper legal standards governing grant or
227
errors in review, obtain undeserved patents. An independent misuse
226. It might be argued that these doctrines form part of a general patent misuse
regime. Although they certainly police against abuse of the patent system, that semantic
argument misses the point of the justification inquiry. It would be equivalent to claiming that
antitrust law constitutes part of the patent misuse doctrine. The question is whether the
misuse doctrine as currently defined and applied by the courts–defensive, scope of the patent
inquiry, blanket unenforceability–should continue to exist, not redefined to include other
existing legal doctrines designed to prevent the identified harm.
227. Numerous factors contribute to the existing problems, ranging from the need to
refine standards for patentability (subject matter, novelty/obviousness), inadequate funding
of the Patent and Trademark Office access to prior art and the need to improve post-grant
review. See supra note 50; infra notes 287–88 and accompanying text; Chiappetta, Internet,
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doctrine targeting behavior conforming to existing requirements and
procedures makes no sense. It illogically punishes compliance while
doing nothing to address the actual problem. Implementation failures
require modification of the problematic internal issuance standards and
examination by an adequately funded and staffed Patent Office
228
equipped with the necessary tools and review procedures.
If “misuse” occurs, it involves applicant acts or omissions that
interfere with the application of properly calibrated rules and
examination procedures. Patent law’s inequitable conduct doctrine
229
specifically targets that issue.
It sanctions applicant
misrepresentations (affirmative or by omission) to the Patent Office
when found material to the patentability inquiry (not merely when
determinative to the outcome on the merits) and made with intent to
230
deceive. Such a misrepresentation is sufficient for finding a violation;
it need not affect the actual validity of the patent on the merits. The
doctrine’s application and remedy roughly parallel misuse–providing a
defense to alleged infringements (rather than an affirmative claim) and
231
resulting in the blanket unenforceability of the related patent’s claims.
Many question the efficacy of the current inequitable conduct
supra note 39, at 333–39 (discussing the issues in connection with ensuring the quality of
business method patents).
228. See generally supra note 227. The issue is complicated by the fact that such
adjustments themselves impose costs, requiring a separate net assessment of the related
changes and investments. See infra Part III.B.1. One way to reduce the public cost would be
to internalize it into the acquisition of the patent right by requiring patent applicants provide
affirmative assistance, such as performing a search and providing the results with their
application. See infra note 235 and accompanying text. The failure to do so might be
considered “misuse” as discussed below in the text.
229. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1102 (4th ed. 2007); Janis, supra note 87, at 262–68
(discussing the origins and evolution of the doctrine). The “Walker Process doctrine”
permits antitrust claims using the act of fraudulently obtaining a patent as the predatory act
for proving monopolization or attempt to monopolize under Sherman Act § 2. See Walker
Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175–79 (1965). Although
the Walker Process doctrine thus constrains improper patent acquisition, it fits more
comfortably with, and is discussed in connection with, improper assertions of such patents
infra at notes 242–52 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365
(Fed Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1595 (2009) (“To successfully prove inequitable
conduct, the accused infringer must present “evidence that the applicant (1) made an
affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material information, or
submitted false material information, and (2) intended to deceive the [PTO].”). The specifics
of both the “materiality” and “intent” requirements remain, or to put it tactfully, elusive. See
Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rehearing en
banc granted, 374 Fed.Appx. 35 (Fed.Cir.(Cal.) Apr 26, 2010).
231. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 229, at 1106–07 (citing to J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
Let Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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doctrine.
Serious concerns have been raised concerning its practical
effect on patent prosecution, both as a result of confusion over its
requirements and the substantive obligations it imposes (whatever they
may be). Commentators point out that its uncertain disclosure and
233
intent requirements drive over-submission and under-explanation,
increasing the burdens and costs of obtaining a patent (as well as the
public costs of administration). Substantive ambiguity also makes
infringement claims riskier, more time consuming and expensive. These
problems make patents less desirable and less able to perform their
incentive function.
Finding the appropriate balance involves numerous considerations:
the costs imposed by improperly issued patents, the costs of eliminating
them (including dealing with unavoidable ambiguity and error in patent
prosecution) and the patent regime’s need to deliver appropriate
234
incentives at reasonable cost in a reasonable time.
Some have so
despaired of the possibility of repair that they have urged Congress to
eliminate the doctrine entirely and replace it with some mix of increased
applicant submission requirements and PTO investigative powers,
enhanced post-issuance review proceedings, and deterrence through
fines (in lieu of the unenforceability remedy) penalizing non235
compliance.
The issue here, however, is not the failings of existing inequitable
236
conduct doctrine but whether misuse provides a better solution.
Abuse of the patenting process clearly is inconsistent with the patent
232. Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rehearing
en banc granted, 374 Fed.Appx. 35 (Fed.Cir.(Cal.) Apr 26, 2010); ABA Delegates to Weigh in
on; Support Fixing Inequitable Conduct Defense, Pat., Trademark & Copyright Law Daily
(BNA) (Aug. 6, 2009), reprinted in 8/6/2009 PTD d1 (Westlaw); ABA Section Urges Leahy,
Specter to Limit, Not Eliminate Inequitable Conduct Defense, Pat. Trademark & Copyright
Law Daily (BNA) (Feb. 24, 2009), reprinted in 2/24/2009 PTD d1 (Westlaw); IPO Annual
Meeting Panel Debate: Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Worth Saving?, Pat., Trademark &
Copyright Law Daily (BNA) (Oct. 6, 2008), reprinted in 10/6/2008 PTD d3 (Westlaw).
233. See id.
234. See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177, 179–80 (Harlan, J., concurring) (pointing out
the need to distinguish between cases of “deliberate fraud” and patents voidable “under one
or more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance of a patent” to avoid adverse
effects on patent law’s encouragement of innovation).
235. See supra note 232.
236. Requirements limiting the application of antitrust and other general laws mean
they will not reach or sanction much problematic applicant behavior during prosecution. For
example, the heightened “fraud” standard for Walker Process antitrust liability, discussed
infra note 236, likely does not reach less egregious actions that may, nonetheless, increase
costs or errors in prosecution. Similarly, the substantial constraints on finding common law
fraud prevent its use to reach much applicant behavior which impedes reaching proper
prosecution outcomes. Cf., J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559 (“Conduct before the PTO that may
render a patent unenforceable is broader than common law fraud.”).
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regime’s goal of promoting innovation, the asserted primary justification
237
Additionally, obtaining an unmerited patent meets the
for misuse.
doctrinal requirement of exceeding the scope of the invention, as mere
238
acquisition produces unwarranted rights.
The difficulty lies (again) in the doctrine’s lack of nuance.
Appropriately addressing improper applicant prosecution behavior
requires more than identifying an improper outcome. It also must
239
240
consider the same cost-benefit and deterrence issues causing the
present difficulties in inequitable conduct. An independent misuse
doctrine adds nothing to that discussion. At best, it would incorporate
the ultimate inequitable conduct outcomes, adding only duplication and
another set of costs. At worst, it would introduce the confusion of
conflicting requirements, generating additional rounds of expensive and
time consuming attempts to reconcile the two approaches seeking to
241
accomplish the same end.
ii.

Inappropriate enforcement of patents

A patent permits the owner to threaten and seek judicial
enforcement for alleged infringement. Although enforcement is by its
nature disruptive, time-consuming and expensive, the costs cannot be
entirely avoided.
They represent the logical consequences of
237. See supra notes 170, 198 and accompanying text.
238. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971); supra
notes 54–72 and accompanying text (discussing the patent policy “limitation to the invention”
on which misuse is based).
239. See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text.
240. Misuse applied to behavior that results in an invalid patent claim, at most, only
adds the deterrent downside of rendering all the patent’s claims unenforceable. When the
patent is entirely invalid there is no downside at all, making the attempt to mislead “worth
the risk”. Inequitable conduct’s unenforceability remedy suffers from the same short-coming,
leading advocates for its reform to argue for financial penalties instead. See supra note 235.
Adding the ability to affirmatively assert the improper conduct and claim damages rather
than merely raise it as a defense to infringement, a serious flaw in misuse as well, would also
go far toward resolving the issue. See infra notes 242–52 (discussing the “Walker Process”
antitrust claims predicated on improper prosecution behavior).
241. Protecting the patent regime’s ability to implement its innovation goals certainly
justifies some form of legal intervention. Cf. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto.
Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815–20 (1945) (making the point and citing to Morton
Salt, but not specifically applying the patent misuse doctrine). See also Walker Process
Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175–78 (1965) (citing to Precision
Instrument). As noted above, although a logical argument can be made that the inequitable
conduct issue is a form of patent misuse, that semantic argument misses the point of the
justification inquiry. See supra note 226. The question is whether the existing misuse doctrine
provides a uniquely useful mechanism for resolving the concern. As in this case it does not, it
makes more sense to leave the courts and Congress to refine the inequitable conduct doctrine
in light of that experience rather than compound the problem with parallel and duplicative
misuse modifications simply to preserve the doctrine’s name.
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implementing the patent regime’s incentive through a legal right to
exclude. Such costs are, however, much more problematic when
enforcement activities involve an invalid patent or target a noninfringer. As such situations do not advance the incentive goals of the
regime, in a perfect world they should never arise. In the real world,
uncertainty and legitimate error must be given their due. To hold
patent owners strictly accountable for every improper assertion would
substantially reduce the value of patents, seriously undermining the
242
regime’s ability to provide the desired incentives.
Non-misuse (general) law seeks to reconcile these competing
243
interests through the tort of abuse of process and antitrust law’s
244
These laws seek an
“sham” litigation and Walker Process doctrines.
appropriate balance by expressly requiring proof of the patent owner’s
bad faith. The first two laws sanction claims made without probable
cause (without a reasonable, objective basis for believing the patent
valid) and for an ulterior motive (a purpose other than obtaining
245
substantive adjudication of the claim).
The last requires intentional
246
Because these requirements
fraud during patent prosecution.

242. See, e.g., Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 179–80; USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694
F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (both discussing the adverse effects of over-sanctioning patent
owners on the patent regime). In addition seeking judicial assistance in enforcement is a
form of government petition and raises First Amendment concerns. See E.R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 137–38 (1961); infra note 250 (discussing
related possible limitation on misuse).
243. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674–75 (1977).
244. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 200–20; Janis, supra note 87, at 268–77; MERGES &
DUFFY, supra note 229, ch. 12.D. The precise relationship between Walker Process claims
and “sham” litigation is unclear. The Federal Circuit distinguishes between the former’s
foundational antecedent “fraud” on the patent office and the latter’s focus on abuse of the
litigation process. See, e.g., Dippin’ Dots Inc. v. Mosely, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 948 (2007); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Janis, supra note 85, at 276–77; Merges & Duffy, supra note 229, at 1277–79.
245. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 62–63
(1993). The Court has emphasized that antitrust liability requires both objectively baseless
and subjectively motivated by anticompetitive purpose, but discussed the former requirement
by reference to the tort abuse of process. See id. at 60–63. To the extent they are equivalent,
abuse of process and sham litigation provide alternative bases for challenging the same
action, assertion of an objectively baseless claim for ulterior motives. However, antitrust
sanctions will only apply if the action harms competition, not merely a competitor. See id. at
60–61. See also Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d 1059; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 219, at 1278–79
(discussing the narrowing of the antitrust “sham” litigation doctrine by the Court in
Professional Real Estate Investors). Additionally, antitrust recovery also requires satisfying
all the elements of an antitrust violation, including demonstrating a net harm has occurred.
246. Because a Walker Process claim exposes the patent owner to antitrust remedies
(including treble damages), its fraud requirement is substantially higher than under
inequitable conduct or common law fraud. See Janis, supra note 87, at 268–75 (discussing the
evolution of the standard); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 229, at 1278.
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significantly reduce the likelihood of liability for asserting invalid rights
or making claims against non-infringers, society unquestionably bears
some excess costs. The question is whether the misuse defense better
addresses the problem.
Improper assertion cases bear a strong conceptual connection to
247
misuse’s focus on preventing patent over-reaching.
They clearly
involve actions beyond the scope of the patent right producing
unmerited social costs. The difficulty, again, lies in the particulars of
application. Under existing doctrine, the misuse defense would be
triggered by finding that the assertion went beyond the physical or
248
temporal scope of the patent.
That technically occurs in every case
lost by the patent owner, including those based on non-infringement.
Imposing liability on that basis would make patent assertion a perilous
proposition. The vagaries of litigation coupled with the risk of losing
even an otherwise valid patent would heavily bias any rational owner
toward limiting claims having a substantially certain positive outcome.
That would significantly reduce the value of patents, making the regime
249
much less effective in accomplishing its incentive function.
Adding appropriate “wiggle room” is precisely what drives the abuse
of process, “sham” litigation, and Walker Process requirements.
Although these doctrines may provide imperfect solutions, as with the
earlier antitrust and inequitable conduct inquiries, the failure of existing
law to fully deliver on its assigned goal does not justify misuse. Misuse
must provide a better solution.
Achieving a proper balance through misuse would require a
complete overhaul of the doctrine. To avoid over-sanction, its “scope of
the patent” inquiry would need to be jettisoned in favor of an inquiry
permitting reasonable error (likely involving the objective merits and
subjective motivations) and acknowledging First Amendment
250
limitations.
To provide proper relief and deterrence, the blanket
unenforceability remedy would be replaced by relief offering the nuance
of the tort and antitrust law approaches–injunctions and damages
247. Cf. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (2000)
(indicating, perhaps, room may exist for a misuse claim even absent fraud on the patent office
or sham litigation, but ultimately being circumspect regarding the appropriate bases for such
a claim).
248. See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text (making the same point with
regard to inequitable conduct).
249. See In re Indep. Serv. Org., 203 F.3d at 1327–28 (“misuse law and precedent need
not be enlarged into an open-ended pitfall for patent supported commerce”).
250. See id. (The conduct to which the jury instruction on misuse generally refers —
”wrongful” enforcement of patents, is actively protected under Noerr and California Motor,
and is not subject to collateral attack as a new ground of “misuse.”).
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addressing the actual harms caused and exemplary damages deterring
251
unjustified assertions in the first instance.
Making such dramatic changes to misuse would entail an
unnecessary and expensive process merely to address the general law
252
concerns and adopt similar solutions. Moreover, even if the necessary
adjustments were made, avoiding confusion and waste would lead to
eliminating one of the regimes, making the misuse exercise a
meaningless duplicative exercise. The better solution lies in making the
changes directly to the existing general law regimes.
PART III: WHAT NEXT?
A. Eliminating Misuse
Misuse cannot be justified under the existing market efficiency
253
paradigm. The doctrine should be eliminated. Although the Federal
254
Circuit’s anticompetitive effects requirement mitigates the concern,
two arguments strongly support more definitive action. First, as long as
the doctrine exists it will be asserted. That will trigger unhelpful and
expensive debates over the doctrine’s appropriate reach and, most
particularly, if, how, and when the anticompetitive effects requirement
255
should be applied. As no reason exists for preserving misuse at all, no
time or resources should be wasted on discussing its proper application.
Second, even should that process ultimately successfully cabin most
misuse applications to antitrust principles, the Federal Circuit cannot
eliminate the continuing damage done by the Supreme Court’s per se
256
misuse precedents.
Full resolution requires direct and immediate
251. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of the
patent misuse unenforceability remedy compared to antitrust law’s more flexible approach).
252. As with inequitable conduct, existence of the specialized legal doctrines governing
inappropriate patent assertion support some supplemental legal constraint beyond that
provided by other “general law” (including fraud and antitrust). Although these doctrines
might be viewed as addressing forms of “patent misuse,” they differ significantly from current
misuse doctrine, procedurally, substantively and remedially. The relevant question is
whether misuse adds something which justifies its independent existence. See supra notes 226
(discussing the error in treating these other doctrines as forms of “misuse”), 236–41 and
accompanying text (discussing the same “changes” point in connection with inequitable
conduct).
253. The above analysis confirms Judge Posner’s wry but insightful observation that in
the current economic efficiency paradigm “our law is not rich in alternative concepts to
monopolistic abuse.” USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982).
254. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text (discussing the unhelpful “scope of
the patent” distraction and the problems it raised in Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616
F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
256. See supra note 87.
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intervention.
Theoretically, congressional action provides the cleanest solution.
That body clearly has the authority under its Constitutional mandate to
257
set patent policy
and could definitively resolve the issue by
legislatively overruling the judicial doctrine. Moreover, adding misuse
to the ongoing patent reform discussion would provide useful assistance
in understanding other issues on the agenda, such as helping distinguish
between internal calibration and exploitation implementation
shortcomings, as well as identifying underlying normative
258
disagreements. Despite these benefits, the present polarized political
environment makes it unlikely the legislature can engage in coherent,
259
much less productive, expanded patent policy debate.
Fortunately, an alternative exists. The Supreme Court created
misuse and has the ability to bring down the curtain on its now overly
long run. The Federal Circuit’s anticompetitive effects approach
generates a myriad of appeals, offering ready opportunity for Supreme
260
Court review.
The emergence of modern antitrust law provides the
necessary jurisprudential justification for reversing the long-standing
261
misuse precedents.
The Court originally created the misuse doctrine to deal with use of
262
263
patent power in the absence of other effective legal constraints. As
257. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 229, at 7; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also
supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of United States patent law).
258. See infra Part III.B.
259. The reality of how hard it is to obtain political consensus even in “good” times
was evident in the early effort to tie misuse to antitrust law. See supra note 101 (discussing
the issue in connection with the 1988 amendments to § 271(d)).
260. Ironically, the better job the Federal Circuit does of cabining the doctrine, the less
likely those most directly affected (patent holders) are to appeal. The best avenue to the
Court may therefore lie in questioning the Federal Circuit’s proper application of antitrust
principles, giving the Court the opportunity to dispense with the unnecessary intermediary
misuse doctrine as well as to clean up antitrust law in the innovation context. See supra notes
164–65 (discussing the disagreement between the Federal Circuit majority and dissent over
the proper application of antitrust law in Princo); supra notes 208–13 (discussing the concern
more generally).
261. The doctrine of stare decisis demands more than the Justices’ belief that the prior
decisions are incorrect. It requires a clear rationale for abandoning the precedent. Of direct
relevance to misuse, the Court has recently revisited a number of long standing antitrust
precedents and determined that the evolution of antitrust analysis has sufficiently
undermined their original foundations to justify overruling them. See, e.g., Leegin Creative
Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887–88, 899–907 (2007) (albeit over a very
vigorous dissent); State Oil, Inc. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–22 (1997). As discussed in the text,
that evolution applies with equal force to the continued usefulness of misuse.
262. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519
(1917) (“A restriction which would give to the [patent owner] such a potential power of evil
over an industry . . . .”); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942)
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the Court recently noted in Illinois Tool Works, modern antitrust law
now provides a better understanding of patent power and its effects
than the presumptions reflected in misuse precedent. The mere
possession of a patent does not create sufficient market power to disrupt
265
the invisible hand; in fact, in most cases, it does not. Nor does every
266
patent related transaction produce an undesirable outcome; in fact,
most do not. The Rule of Reason provides a superior legal tool for
making those important distinctions and antitrust remedies permit
better calibrated responses to any resulting harms. Together they
render the much blunter misuse scope of the patent/blanket
unenforceability approach obsolete.
267
Nor does past Congressional action prevent Court action. That
institution’s statutory misuse interventions should be interpreted in the
light of the legislative-judicial relationship regarding the management of
anticompetitive market activity. The Sherman Act left creation and
evolution of appropriate responses to the courts; a task they equally
268
269
clearly accepted.
The legislative limitations on misuse
no more
(“respondent is making use of its patent monopoly to restrain competition” and “the use of [a
patent monopoly] to suppress competition”); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32–33 (1964)
(“using the licenses to project its monopoly beyond the patent period,” “to exact the same
terms and conditions,” “subject to [the patent’s] leverage,” and “negotiate with the leverage
of that monopoly”); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 137–140
(1969) (“may not use the power of his patent,” “used its patent leverage to coerce a promise,”
“use the power of his patent to insist,” and “using that monopoly to coerce agreement”);
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34 (1931) (The Court found
“analogous to the use of a patent as an instrument for restraining commerce which was
condemned under the Sherman Anti-trust Law . . . .”). The Federal Circuit majority in
Princo clearly saw the connection, but lacked the authority to fully implement its
ramifications. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
263. Misuse arose before “there was any significant body of federal antitrust law, and
reached maturity long before that law . . . attained its present broad scope.” See USM Corp.
v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982). The Court’s last substantive misuse case
was decided in 1969, well before the Rule of Reason net efficiency calculus which emerged in
the late 1970s. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, § 2.2b–2.2e (discussing the emergence of the
“Chicago school” and its effect on antitrust policy during the 1970s and 1980s). Most
importantly, that opinion reflected the emerging net outcome antitrust approach in its
dismissal of the per se approach based on the patents physical and temporal scope in favor of
“balancing.” See supra notes 16, 166–70 and accompanying text (discussing Zenith Radio).
264. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also Cnty. Materials
Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2008).
265. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45–46.
266. Id. at 44–45 (“Many tying arrangements, even those involving patents and
requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free, competitive market.”).
267. See supra notes 90–102 and accompanying text (describing the two Congressional
actions involving patent misuse).
268. See State Oil, Inc. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1977); AREEDA ET AL., supra note
25, at 35–38; Sullivan, supra note 36, at 8.
269. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
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signaled Congress’s intention to freeze misuse in its then-current state
than passage of the Clayton Act mandated termination of judicial
changes in antitrust doctrine. Rather, Section 271(d) reflects a
legislative desire to prevent over-expansion of the judicial doctrine,
270
otherwise leaving the status quo of court management intact.
Moreover, interpreting misuse intervention more expansively would
incongruously leave the courts far-ranging freedom to adjust “statutory”
antitrust law (which it does, frequently making significant doctrinal
271
changes) but without authority to adjust its own misuse doctrine as
necessary to produce compatible results.
Nor would judicial elimination of misuse render Congressional
action meaningless. The relevant statutory sections operate entirely in
the negative. They contain nothing mandating misuse; they merely
272
prevent its application in particular situations.
Those restrictions
would simply be subsumed into a more general judicial determination
273
that the doctrine no longer serves any valid purpose as a whole.
274
Finally, private reliance interests are of little, if any, concern.
Eliminating misuse would leave licensing term assessment to antitrust
and other general laws’ already independently applicable requirements.
As a result, no existing transactions would require adjustment.
Increased flexibility may disadvantage some earlier prospective
licensees. Misuse prohibitions may have forced them to pursue
alternatives, producing sunk costs and existing agreements impairing
their transition to the patented solution. Those problems, however,
stem from misuse’s elimination of alternatives, not an assumption that
misuse would continue to protect their interests. In all events, to the
extent such individual harms occur, they will be temporary in nature,
hardly meriting forcing society to bear the misuse doctrine’s much
greater inefficiencies.
The Court should take immediate action, granting certiorari at the
275
first opportunity.
Merely adopting the Federal Circuit’s competitive
effects approach as the general misuse test would needlessly leave the
doctrine in place, leading to superfluous claims and pointless debates
270. See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 261; Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52, n. 19 (1977)
(overruling U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
272. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text; Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
273. Cf. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 905–07 (2007).
274. Id. at 906–07.
275. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010); See supra
note 260 (discussing the possibility of an appeal based on the Princo application of antitrust
law).
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over its proper application. The Court should instead explicitly overrule
its earlier decisions creating the doctrine and affirmatively place the
related patent concerns exclusively within the province of “general law,”
including antitrust, inequitable conduct, abuse of process and antitrust
sham and Walker Process claims.
B. Living with Patents: Getting What We Want from Patent Law
Taking misuse out of the equation does not ensure proper patent
outcomes. Patent law’s significant internal difficulties have produced
spirited reform debate over issues ranging over the entire possible
276
range, from subject matter through remedies.
The primary misuse
277
replacement, antitrust law, similarly raises serious concerns. Rule of
Reason assessment is uncertain, time-consuming and expensive.
Existing doctrinal standards severely constrain application to minimize
false positives, making it a questionable tool for dealing with
278
problematic issues such as pharmaceutical reverse-payments and
279
standards capture.
The reason misuse comes so readily to mind as a solution and the
logic for nonetheless abandoning it tell us much about how best to
approach these important concerns. Labeling a patent problem
“misuse” because it “exceeds the scope of the patent” is an apparently
logical recognition of a patent’s inherent limitations. Taking away an
offending owner’s patent provides an emotionally satisfying response.
However, the doctrine most frequently produces either an over, or
under response, providing no useful assistance in addressing, much less
resolving, the problems we actually face when it comes to living with
patents.
Finding appropriate solutions requires acknowledging that the
regime by its nature makes some pain inevitable. As a result, when
responding to complaints we must distinguish between those complaints
meriting action and those which do not. That, in turn, means we should
only respond to pain arising from adverse effects not essential to
accomplishing the goals we have set for the regime. Thus redefined,
legitimate “misuse” concerns only arise from two sources: (1) improper
276. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee’s Amendment Seeks to Restart Patent Reform
Discussion and Patent Community Mostly Supports Senate’s Substitute Amendment on Patent
Reform, Pat., Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA) (Mar. 9, 2010) reprinted in 3/9/2010
PTD d1 (Westlaw); Patent Reform Compromise Won’t End Debate, LAW 360
(March 5, 2010), http://www.law360.com/print_article/153905.
277. See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 2.
279. See supra note 8.
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doctrinal implementation generating harms unnecessary to produce the
agreed goal, or (2) disagreement over the goal, making even harms
necessary to produce the rejected objectives unacceptable.
Beyond identifying the two sources of proper complaints that should
frame our patent discussions, the “improper implementation-goals
disagreement” formulation of misuse provides an additional important
insight. The two sources of patent difficulty involve very different
concerns and require very different solutions. Without agreement on
what we want to achieve addressing how best to accomplish our goal
makes little sense. That makes it vital to avoid confusing and
unproductive conflation of discussion over where we want to go with
how to get there.
1.

Complaints Involving Improper Implementation

Many (and likely, most) current complaints about patents raise
concerns, make arguments, and suggest solutions within the patent
280
regime’s existing efficiency paradigm.
These discussions should be
treated exclusively as doctrinal implementation concerns with that goal
providing the exclusive assessment metrics. An appropriate outcome
requires that internal patent law issuance requirements, rights, and
remedies produce the optimal increase in innovation taking into account
the access harms produced by a legal right to exclude others. Similarly,
proper general law constraint of patent exploitation, in particular by
antitrust law, must prevent additional net reductions in efficiency caused
by conditions on permitted access.
These two straight-forward
guidelines control regardless of the effects on specific individuals. If
complaints persist, then non-efficiency concerns are in play. That
requires we first address the antecedent normative question of “what we
281
want” before pursuing implementation.
The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by its application
282
to the hotly contested issues on the current patent reform agenda.
The highly contentious debate over patentable subject matter (including

280. When proponents explicitly state their proposal implicates non-efficiency
normative drivers, then implementation should give way to goal discussion. See infra Part
III.B.2.
281. See infra Part III.B.2. In many cases the value of the implementation-normative
dichotomy will be to “smoke out” either disingenuous or latent desires for either enhanced
individual returns or avoidance of individual distributional harms. Once normative
resolution has been reached, the problem again becomes assuring proper implementation,
with the identified outcome providing the necessary metric for determining appropriate
doctrinal outcomes as described for efficiency in the text.
282. See supra note 276.
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business methods,
DNA and “natural law” medical diagnostic
284
techniques) provides a good baseline example. Advocates for
patentability argue the patent incentive is essential to spurring adequate
innovation in those fields. Those wary of such patent’s adverse
consequences, in particular competitors and end-users, argue the
additional innovation produced (if any) does not justify the associated
costs.
The efficiency-implementation metric clarifies how these conflicting
positions should be assessed: will such patents produce optimal
increases in innovation, in light of the related inefficiencies? A positive
285
response means such patents should be granted, while answering in
the negative means they should be withheld. Granting the patents will
undeniably cause harm to those feeling the exclusionary effects.
Refusing such patents will equally certainly produce free-riding harms
to those investing and, ultimately, to some reduction in such activity. In
either case, however, the harms reflect only the inherent cost of
pursuing the efficiency goal.
The above does not mean that the complaints of those suffering
adverse effects have no merit, only that they raise concerns
inappropriate to the implementation debate. An efficient market does
not ensure we each receive everything we desire. Nor will it protect
individuals from, sometimes substantial, harm. However, these personal
outcome concerns require a very different inquiry, one which explicitly
assesses, rather than assumes, the desirability of an efficiency-based
patent law. Addressing them as implementation issues looks in the
wrong place for resolution. It makes no logical sense to discuss the how
286
before we have determined what we want.
The efficiency-implementation metric similarly clarifies the myriad
“bad patent” discussions, such as the appropriate level of pre-issuance
287
examination, proper forms of post-issuance review, and the standards
288
Within the efficiency paradigm, the
governing inequitable conduct.
only relevant metric is whether the rules optimally produce “good and
283. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Chiappetta, Internet, supra note 39.
284. See supra note 6.
285. There are, of course, a variety of possible forms such patents might take. The
same metric applies to specific proposals as to the simplified “yes-no” question discussed in
the text. See Chiappetta, Internet, supra note 39, at 310 (discussing the range of options,
including allowing patent protection but adjusting the related rights and remedies).
286. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the nature of normative disagreement and how it
affects the related debates).
287. See, e.g., Tight Budget May Delay Kappos’ Plans For USPTO, LAW 360 (March
10, 2010), http://www.law360.com/print_article/150390.
288. See supra notes 232–35 and accompanying text.
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timely” patents in light of the related efficiency costs. Those suffering
the consequences, whether of undeserved patents or increased costs of
review, have merely been tapped to bear the unavoidable consequences
of an efficiency driven system. If that bad distributional karma proves
unacceptable, the appropriate response is to argue for changing the
regime’s goals, not for adjustments in its doctrine.
The intense debate over injunctions and apportionment of damages
289
is similarly simplified.
Market efficiency dictates an injunction
whenever specific enforcement produces optimal net incentives in light
290
Damage apportionment proposals should be
of the related costs.
tested against that same standard, taking into account unavoidable error
and costs of administration. Patent owners disgruntled by reduced
individual returns will complain of injustice. Disfavored competitors
and consumers will bemoan hold-out compensation extorted by
291
“unproductive trolls” and the disconnection between damage awards
292
and the patent’s actual contribution. But when, in aggregate, patent
remedies cause no more harm than that necessary to produce the
regime’s targeted outcome of maximally efficient market operation
under the real world circumstances, such complaints challenge the
desirability of its goal, not its implementation.
Although when an owner grants access to a patent, the concern
moves beyond internal patent law calibration to general law governance
293
of terms of access, the implementation metric remains the same.
Patent owners’ actions must be assessed for additional unmerited costs.
Within the current efficiency maximizing paradigm, proper
implementation depends exclusively on whether general law (including
antitrust) appropriately identifies and sanctions activities that on net
289. See supra note 9.
290. The focus in eBay on using traditional equitable factors in its multi-opinion eBay
decision only vaguely helps apply the efficiency metric. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provides more guidance, in
particular, by looking to the sufficiency of monetary damages under the circumstances (which
the lower courts seem to have pursued in the emerging “competitor” inquiry). See supra note
9.
291. Viewed through the lens of patent policy, a patent troll does not act
inappropriately by refusing access until payment is made. Society has assigned them control
over their patent bridge explicitly to exact the toll for crossing as an incentive to innovate for
the common good. If the implementation of the right to exclude produces a net harm, that is
a short-coming in patent law, not the patent owner’s actions, and should be adjusted by
changing the law not punishing the owner. See supra note 290 (discussing one such
adjustment, the change in availability of injunctions).
292. See supra note 9.
293. As discussed in Part II.B, any action beyond a mere refusal to grant access should
be subjected to general law review. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text
(discussing the point in the context of the misuse “scope of the patent” inquiry).
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decrease efficient market performance. When properly calibrated,
general law will still permit social costs and a variety of individual
harms, but they will only be those required to produce the targeted
system goal. Complaints over those negative effects may have
normative merit, but they have no role in an efficiency-driven
implementation discussion.
294
The industry standard’s ambush and reverse payments “misuse”
295
concerns illustrate the point. Within the market efficiency paradigm,
the only relevant question is whether these actions produce net
efficiency losses. If so, and they are not captured by applicable general
law, then an implementation adjustment should be made. But those
changes should only go as far as necessary to produce the targeted net
efficient outcome. Any remaining concerns, for example with the
“ethical” propriety of an “ambusher’s” behavior, or the distributional
consequences of suppressing lower cost generics, are irrelevant to the
discussion. They may have merit, but they belong in a separate debate
which explicitly considers the desirability of moving away from market
efficiency to incorporate other considerations.
Segregating the implementation inquiry from debate over goals and
focusing on the net efficiency metric does not make implementation
296
easy in practice.
The related factual determinations trigger
contentious debates over relevant benefits and costs, require expensive
and time-consuming data collection and necessitate complex
interpretation, quantification, and doctrinal decisions.
However,
interjecting other metrics reflecting other goals only exacerbates the
situation, particularly when proponents articulate their concerns in
market paradigm terms and frame their solutions as doctrinal
adjustments. Developing a patent system that produces what we want
requires that we first agree upon the goal. Combining the two activities
will only produce a very poorly constructed and expensive road to
nowhere, if it produces anything useful at all.
2.

Complaints Involving Goal Disagreements

Many “misuse” issues and reform proposals (including some
purporting to improve market operation) seek outcomes in conflict with
297
the current efficiency paradigm.
A common objective involves
294. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
296. See Chiappetta, Internet, supra note 39, at 310–11.
297. The innovation policy concerns of misuse proponents provide a useful example
beyond those discussed in the text. The innovation primacy argument goes beyond whether
existing legal doctrine fails to produce optimally net efficient outcomes to advocacy of
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changing the distributional consequences. Reflecting only real supply
and demand, an efficient market will deny some (even many) what they
believe to be their “due,” others their “needs” and yet others any
allocation at all. The “losers” (and others sympathetic to their
situation) find that outcome unacceptable and demand adjustments, not
because the market is operating inefficiently, but based on notions of
what constitutes a “fair” and “just” society. Similarly, the standard
“ambush” and patent “troll” rhetoric can reasonably be interpreted as
298
raising concerns over the “ethics” of the challenged behavior.
But
attaching moral approbation to such patent owners’ activities requires a
significant change from the current efficiency drivers. In that paradigm,
aggressive pursuit of self-interest is affirmatively promoted, subject only
299
to the constraints of a properly operating competitive marketplace.
The distinction between implementation shortcomings and goal
disagreement debates provides the way forward. First, it ensures we do
300
not conflate these two very different kinds of patent problems.
Addressing undesirable consequences of an efficient market by ensuring
existing laws produce maximum efficiency will only serendipitously even
301
address, much less resolve, these complaints.
Similarly, arguing for
rules implementing distributional or behavioral goals without
addressing the resulting inefficiencies will gain no traction with those
firmly in the market economy camp. At best, doctrine-based arguments
seeking to resolve normative disagreement cause us to talk past each
302
other and, more frequently, polarize and poison debate.
Second, it clarifies that unlike implementation, no ready metric
protecting innovation in its own right. See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
Although there is nothing normative inappropriate with the latter view, it will not be
produced by laws designed to ensure an efficient market. If it is to be pursued as social
policy, it should be raised explicitly and the related decision made prior to embarking on
implementation.
298. See supra notes 8–9, discussing the complaints.
299. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
300. Cf. generally Chiappetta, International, supra note 24 (discussing the issue in
connection with resolving conflicting normative approaches to intellectual property law).
301. Frequently, of course, such debates will involve questions of degree. For example,
a substantial majority of the United States citizenry may agree that the efficient market
approach produces the best possible basic means for allocating resources in a constrained real
world (particularly given experience with the alternatives). Disagreement arises because
some significant minority believes that a “just” society will also ensure some threshold level
of access to particular resources (for example, food, shelter and health care). Whether in
whole or in part, these disagreements cannot be resolved by looking at the problem
exclusively through the lens of market efficiency.
302. See Vincent Chiappetta, The (Practical) Meaning of Property, 46 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 297, 335–55 (2009) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Property] (discussing the problematic
nature of normative debate in the context of property law).
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exists to resolve our normative differences. Economic efficiency can
claim no precedence based merely on its consistency with the status quo.
That is the precise source of the opponents’ complaint (citing to existing
law as somehow definitive constitutes a particularly egregious failure in
this regard). Normative disagreement puts all positions back on the
table. But neither can the opponents argue the self-evident “justice” or
“morality” of their distributional or behavioral objectives. After the
facts, positions, and their consequences have been articulated, advocacy
for any particular outcome (whether efficiency, distributional or
behavioral) constitutes no more (nor less) than an expression of
personal preference.
The practical solution lies (perhaps) in acknowledging our
differences and seeking compromise. Shifting debate from an effort to
show others the error of their ways to finding workable outcomes
requires reviewing all potential options for mutually acceptable
concessions. For example, the debate over reverse pharmaceutical
payments triggers conflict among those who view patents as a matter of
labor-based natural rights, those seeking to promote net “efficient”
settlements in a market economy and those believing healthcare
constitutes a fundamental personal right. The range of options is
equally extensive. They range from complete freedom to make
whatever payments the patent owner feels reasonable (giving labor its
due, trumping all other positions) at one end to outright bans
(healthcare access as an individual natural right) at the other. In
between lie the myriad more nuanced compromises such as a
presumption of invalidity (patent owners must prove the payment
reflects something other than collusion with a prospective competitor–
an economic efficiency focus, but with a procedural thumb on the scales
in favor of a right of access) and a presumption of validity (opponents
must prove collusion–an economic efficiency preference with the
procedural thumb now favoring labor natural rights). The objective,
however, is not identifying the normatively “correct” position, but to
find an outcome that permits us to agree despite our conflicting views of
the “right” answer.
The same process applied to standards “ambush” behavioral norm
concerns would shift debate from the relative efficiency merits of
304
private ordering versus fraud/antitrust law intervention
to
consideration of the full range of alternatives. Those would include
303. See id. at 338–42.
304. See supra note 8 (citing references discussing the standard setting issue in the
efficiency context).
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variations on the current patent/general law approach (such as shifting
burdens of proof or a universal and unwaivable obligation of good faith
and fair dealing), mandatory disclosure, and/or requiring reasonable and
nondiscriminatory licensing terms be made available to all. Again, the
goal would be finding an outcome which best accommodates the varying
competing views regarding what matters “most”—efficiency, behavior
or, perhaps, something else.
The pursuit of compromise does not guarantee success. Some
305
normative disagreements involve intractable differences.
Those
believing in the intrinsic “justice” of the competitive marketplace
system may find other distributional outcomes or constraints on pursuit
of individual self interest wholly unacceptable. Those who feel “justice”
requires threshold need-based allocations or believe baseline civility is
essential to a “good” society will find other outcomes anathema. And,
even when some concessions can be made, they may not produce the
necessary common ground for compromise.
In these “hard” cases, resort will be made to the political tools such
as legislative voting, which allow action in the face of unresolved
306
normative conflict.
In these circumstances, and particularly when
demanding an “up or down” vote, we would do well to keep in mind
that the winners do not prevail because the losers have seen the light.
They prevail because they have the power to demand adoption and
enforcement of their preferred outcome. In such cases, one person’s
“justice” remains another’s “misuse”. The real world consequences of
patent law’s right to exclude means such losers will not only find the
outcome “unfair” but have that unfairness made all the more
unpalatable by having to suffer the distributional and behavioral
consequences (whatever they might be). That potent combination can
produce serious questioning of the desirability of the overall social
enterprise—few deprived of necessary medical care or food by a patent
are likely to find sufficient solace in the fact that “in aggregate” it
produces the “greater good.” Attention to these practical consequences
may not ultimately produce solutions, but it should at least cause us to
consider the desirability of resolutely standing on principle in patent
policy debate.
CONCLUSION
Patent misuse was created by the Supreme Court almost a century
ago to address growing concerns over the effects of unchecked patent
305. See Chiappetta, Property, supra note 302, at 352–54.
306. See id. at 354.
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power on the marketplace. That problem has now been more
appropriately addressed by the nuanced inquiries under antitrust law,
the inequitable conduct doctrine and abuse of process and antitrust
sham and Walker Process claims. These legal tools maximize flexibility
in obtaining, enforcing, accessing, and using patented inventions while
ensuring the overall system advances its (current) primary goal of
maximizing efficient market operation. Continued application of
misuse wastes time and resources on the wholesale revision of an
obsolete and affirmatively harmful doctrine to produce, at best, the
same outcome. The patent misuse doctrine should be eliminated.
The misuse experience provides valuable insights regarding how we
might live, if not comfortably and least appropriately, with our patent
regime. It clarifies that every patent right to exclude unavoidably
produces pain which will trigger complaint. The instinct to punish
patent owners when their actions cause discomfort will only
serendipitously produce the desired outcome. Proper response requires
identifying and responding appropriately to the varying sources of
patent unhappiness. If the problem arises from patent law’s improper
implementation of the task we have set for the regime, we should
recalibrate its internal rules governing grant, rights and remedies. If it
arises from inadequate general law supervision of patent use, we should
tighten those regulations. If the complaints reflect the inherent
consequences of implementing patent law in accordance with existing
goals, we must reassess what we desire, but with the understanding that,
however fervently we may wish it, in patents (as with the rest of life) we
cannot have it all.

